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Introduction 
An important question with which lower courts have been wrestling for 
decades—and which the United States Supreme Court may soon address—
is the extent to which the First Amendment permits governmental 
prohibitions on lies in political campaigns.
1
 To date, most courts have 
analyzed such laws as if they were content-based restriction on public 
discourse; the restrictions are thus subjected to “strict scrutiny,” which 
almost always leads to the law’s invalidation. In this Article, I offer a 
different (and, I believe, more helpful) framework for judging the 
constitutionality of laws restricting campaign lies. I suggest that the basic 
inquiry in these cases should be whether the law in question is properly 
considered a regulation within the domain of public discourse, where 
                                                                                                                 
 1. In this Article I use the term “lie” to mean a statement of fact that the speaker knows 
to be untrue or which is made with reckless disregard of whether the statement is true or not. 
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (stating that a statement is made with 
reckless disregard of the truth if the speaker “entertained serious doubts” as to the truth of 
the statement). Some of the regulations discussed in this Article prohibit a broader category 
of expression, including literally true statements intended to mislead the audience. Most of 
the bans on campaign lies that I discuss, however, consistent with my usage involve factual 
misstatements that were either knowingly or recklessly made.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/8
2018]       FREE SPEECH AND DOMAIN ALLOCATION 169 
 
 
government’s ability to regulate the content of speech, including lies, is 
indeed strictly limited; or, alternatively, whether the law is a regulation of 
speech in the election domain, a government-managed sphere where 
government has considerable authority to regulate the content of speech to 
promote the fairness and efficiency of elections. 
Part I of this Article offers a comprehensive review of the relevant case 
law. Section I.A discusses the pertinent United States Supreme Court 
decisions. Although the Court has yet to directly rule on the 
constitutionality of a law prohibiting campaign lies, cases it has decided on 
related matters leave little doubt that it would invalidate on First 
Amendment grounds any broad ban on campaign lies. At the same time, 
however, these cases show that the Court is uncertain about the 
constitutionality of narrowly crafted laws targeting lies particularly 
injurious to the fairness or integrity of the electoral process. Section I.B 
discusses the lower court decisions. In the 1970s and ‘80s, courts were 
divided about the constitutionality of comprehensive bans on campaign lies. 
By the 1990s, however, the lower courts increasingly began to express 
skepticism about the validity of these laws and, consistent with what I have 
inferred from the Supreme Court decisions, have since the beginning of this 
century uniformly invalidated comprehensive bans on campaign lies. An 
open and pressing question, then, is the fate of narrow bans on lies 
concerning such matters as a candidate’s incumbency or party affiliation, or 
about the time and place of an election.  
As discussed in Part II, the answer to the question turns largely on the 
scope of a key component of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence—the rule against content regulation. Section II.A describes 
the All-Inclusive Approach, a view that insists that, except for few narrow 
categories of expression, the rule against content discrimination applies to 
all speech. On this view, even limited, specifically targeted bans on 
campaign lies would likely be deemed unconstitutional. Section II.B 
describes the Domain-Specific Approach, an alternative—and, I believe, 
preferable—view of the scope of the rule against content discrimination. On 
this view, the rule against content regulation is primarily confined to public 
discourse, a domain consisting of expression essential to democratic self-
governance. In other domains, particularly those which government 
manages to accomplish some particular purpose, government has far more 
leeway to regulate the content of speech. It is indisputable that government 
has the constitutional authority to manage elections by, for instance, setting 
the time for an election, providing voting apparatus, counting the ballots, 
and announcing the results. In addition, the Supreme Court has in several 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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cases upheld as part of this managerial authority the power of states 
regulate the content of election-related speech, such as by prohibiting write-
in voting and banning electioneering near the polls. The difficult question, 
therefore, is not whether a government-managed domain of elections exists 
or whether in exercising its authority to manage that domain, government 
can sometimes constitutionally regulate the content of speech. Rather, the 
hard question is how to properly allocate regulations of expression, such as 
bans on campaign lies, at the cusp of the domains of public discourse and 
elections.  
Part III addresses this crucial allocation question. It suggests that this 
allocation should depend upon (1) the extent to which the law in question 
promotes the fairness and efficiency of elections, as compared to (2) the 
extent that the law impairs the democratic function of public discourse. 
Laws comprehensively banning lies by anyone about ballot measures or 
candidates would seriously impair the democratic function of public 
discourse while not directly advancing the fairness or efficiency of 
elections. Such regulations should therefore be considered part of public 
discourse and accordingly be invalidated. In contrast, laws prohibiting lies 
about the time, place, or manner of elections, such as “Republicans vote on 
Tuesday, Democrats on Wednesday,” directly promote the fairness and 
efficiency of elections while not adversely impacting on public discourse. 
Such laws, therefore, should be allocated to the election domain and usually 
upheld. Between these two poles lie harder cases, both in terms of domain 
allocation and ultimate disposition. A law prohibiting candidates from lying 
about their opponents, for instance, presents a particularly difficult case. 
Because this law directly promotes election fairness and would not likely 
have a substantial negative impact on public discourse, it should be 
assigned to the election domain. Nonetheless, the possibility of selective 
enforcement by politically motivated officials puts the constitutionality of 
such laws in doubt.  
The Article concludes with the discussion of Minnesota Voters Alliance 
v. Mansky, a Supreme Court decision issued shortly before this Article was 
published. Significantly, in striking down a law prohibiting the wearing of 
political badges, buttons, or insignias inside a polling place, the Court 
eschews the All-Inclusive Approach and adopts instead a mode of analysis 
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I. Regulations and Judicial Decisions 
Laws in the United States regulating false speech in political campaigns 
are not a new phenomenon, with the first such law dating to 1911.
2
 By 
1975, seventeen states had such laws or regulations on the books,
3
 and by 
2016 “[n]ineteen states [had] passed statutes prohibiting false campaign 
speech in some form.”
4
 Despite the longstanding existence of such laws, 




A. Relevant Supreme Court Cases  
Although the Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion discussing the 
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting false campaign statements,
6
 it has 
decided several cases that cast light on whether such laws comport with the 
First Amendment.  
1. Brown v. Hartlage 
During a press conference, Carl Brown, a candidate for the office of 
county commissioner in Jefferson County, Kentucky, criticized the office’s 
salary as exorbitant.
7
 If elected, he promised to substantially reduce the 
salary he would take.
8
 Upon learning shortly thereafter that this promise 
might have violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act, Brown 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Mark Listes & Wendy Underhill, Campaign Fair Practice Laws (Is There a Right to 
Lie?), NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
elections-and-campaigns/campaign-fair-practice-laws-is-there-a-right-to-lie.aspx. 
 3. Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1273 (1975). 
 4. Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in 
Politics, 38 CAMP. L. REV. 41, 49 (2016). 
 5. Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 3, at 1275 (referring to a “lack of 
direct authority on the constitutionality of campaign falsity statutes”). The article cites but 
two constitutional challenges. Id. at 1275–76 n.235. The cited cases are Vanasco v. 
Schwartz, 56 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1974) (remanding a suit challenging the constitutionality of a 
prohibition on false campaign statements for convocation of three-judge district court) and 
Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 118 (Cal. 1975) (holding that an injunction against 
republication of allegedly deceptive campaign literature was an unconstitutional prior 
restraint of speech). 
 6. In 1976, the Court summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court 
striking down several provisions of a New York election code prohibiting false campaign 
statements. Schwartz v. Postel, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). The decision of the lower court, 
Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (three-judge court), is discussed in 
detail below. See infra notes 107–39 and accompanying text. 
 7. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 47–48 (1982). 
 8. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018





 Despite the retraction, the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals held that the promise invalidated the election, which Brown had 
won.
10
 The United States Supreme Court unanimously held that imposing 
such a penalty on Brown’s speech violated the First Amendment.
11
 
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan readily acknowledged 
that the states have a legitimate interest “in preserving the integrity of their 
electoral processes.”
12
 Brennan emphasized, however, that because “the 
First Amendment was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people,” it “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
conduct of campaigns for political office.”
13
 Accordingly, if “a State seeks 
to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First 
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported 
by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one.”
14
  
Brennan perceived “three bases upon which the application of the 
[Corrupt Practices Act] to Brown’s promise might . . . be justified.”
15
 The 
first was a prohibition on buying votes.
16
 Brennan found, however, that 
because “Brown did not offer some private payment or donation in 
exchange for voter support,” his promise to reduce his salary, like a promise 
to lower taxes, “cannot be deemed beyond the reach of the First 
Amendment, or considered as inviting the kind of corrupt arrangement the 
appearance of which a State may have a compelling interest in avoiding.”
17
  
The second rationale was the concern that “emphasis on free public 
service might result in persons of independent wealth but less ability being 
chosen over those who, though better qualified, could not afford to serve at 
a reduced salary.”
18
 But even though this may be a legitimate interest, 
Brennan explained, “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised 




                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. at 48. 
 10. Id. at 50.  
 11. Id. at 61–62. 
 12. Id. at 52. 
 13. Id. at 53 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971)). 
 14. Id. at 53–54. 
 15. Id. at 54. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 58.  
 18. Id. at 59.  
 19. Id. at 60.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/8
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Finally, and particularly relevant to our inquiry, the sanction on Brown’s 
speech was defended as a restriction on the making of false statements.
20
 
Since the salary for the office for which Brown ran was set by law, he 
would not have been able to deliver on his promise.
21
 Brennan 
acknowledged that “[o]f course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected 
by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”
22
 
“But,” he continued, “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, 
and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”
23
 Because the Kentucky 
law could result in an election victory being overturned even if “the 
offending statement was made in good faith and was quickly repudiated,” 
the law did not afford the “requisite ‘breathing space.’”
24
 Brennan 
concluded his opinion for the Court by observing that in a political 
campaign an inaccurate factual statement by a candidate is “unlikely to 
escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political 
opponent.”
25
 For this reason, in this context “[t]he preferred First 




Reflecting what may well have been the Court’s uncertainty on the 
subject, Brown sent mixed signals about whether it would be constitutional 
to prohibit knowing falsehoods by candidates for elective office. On the one 
hand, emphasizing that “[a] candidate, no less than any other person, has a 
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues,” 
Brennan’s majority opinion subjected the application of the restriction 
imposed on Brown’s speech to strict scrutiny.
27
 On the other hand, despite 
the “strict scrutiny” verbiage, the opinion acknowledged that some forms of 
electoral speech, including “some kinds of promises made by a candidate to 
voters, and some kinds of promises elicited by voters from candidates, may 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Id. at 61.  
 21. Id. at 60. 
 22. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).  
 23. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–
72 (1964)). 
 24. Id. at 61. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring)). Chief Justice Earl Warren concurred in the judgment. Id. at 62 (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). Justice William Rehnquist concurred in the result only, noting that “on different 
facts I think I would give more weight to the State’s interest in preventing corruption in 
elections.” Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result).  
 27. Id. at 53 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976)).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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be declared illegal without constitutional difficulty.”
28
 While the Court 
found that the Kentucky law provided inadequate “breathing space” for 
factual misstatements made in good faith in a political campaign, it 
emphasized that there had been no showing that Brown “made the disputed 
statement other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or 
that he made the statement with reckless disregard as to whether it was false 
or not.”
29
 This qualification seems to leave open the possibility that 
falsehoods made with such “actual malice” might be sanctionable.  
2. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission 
Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets opposing a referendum on a 
proposed school tax levy, violating a provision of Ohio’s Election Code 
requiring campaign material to identify the person or organization 
responsible for its publication.
30
 The Ohio Elections Commission fined 
McIntyre $100.
31
 By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court invalidated 
this provision as violating the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of 
speech.
32
 Finding that the law imposed a content-based restriction 
burdening “core political speech,” Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority 
opinion subjected the law to “exacting scrutiny.”
33
 Stevens summarily 
rejected the state’s argument that its interest in supplying the electorate with 
pertinent information was compelling enough to justify the ban on 
anonymous campaign speech.
34
 In his view, the identity of the speaker was 




In contrast—and relevant to our inquiry about the constitutionality of 
restrictions on campaign lies—Stevens observed that “the state interest in 
preventing fraud and libel stands on a different footing.”
36
 Stevens noted 
that this interest “carries special weight during election campaigns” because 
“false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for 
the public at large.”
37
 He then explained that the “principal weapon against 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 55. 
 29. Id. at 61.  
 30. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1995). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 336, 357. 
 33. Id. at 347. 
 34. Id. at 348–49.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 349. 
 37. Id.  
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 was not the challenged ban on anonymous campaign material; 
rather, the remedy lay in other provisions of the Ohio Election Code 
providing “detailed and specific prohibitions against making or 
disseminating false statements during political campaigns.”
39
 After quoting 
these provisions, however, Stevens explicitly reserved judgment about their 
conformity with the First Amendment: 
We need not, of course, evaluate the constitutionality of the 
provisions. We quote them merely to emphasize that Ohio has 
addressed directly the problem of election fraud. To the extent 
that the anonymity ban indirectly seeks to vindicate the same 
goals, it is merely a supplement to the above provisions.
40
 
Because the “ancillary benefits” provided by the ban on anonymous 
campaign speech could not justify such “extremely broad prohibition,” the 
Court invalidated the anonymity ban.
41
 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist, would have upheld the anonymity ban in light of the 
“widespread and longstanding” American practice of banning anonymous 
campaign speech.
42
 Scalia also accused the majority of significantly 
underestimating the role that the ban on anonymous campaign speech 
played in promoting Ohio’s various prohibitions of campaign lies.
43
 Like 
the majority, Scalia did not express a view about the constitutionality of 
Ohio’s ban on false campaign speech. Significantly, however, he observed 
that “protection of the election process justifies limitations upon speech that 
cannot be imposed generally” and emphasized that “no justification for 
regulation is more compelling than protection of the electoral process.”
44
 It 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 350. 
 39. Id. at 349.  
 40. Id. at 350 n.12. Stevens readily acknowledged that “ancillary benefits” provided by 
the ban on anonymous campaign speech were “assuredly legitimate” in that it deterred “the 
making of false statements by unscrupulous prevaricators.” Id. at 351. Of course, that an 
interest may be legitimate does not mean that it is sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict 
scrutiny. 
 41. Id. at 351.  
 42. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 43. Scalia observed that “the distributor of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is 
anonymous runs much more risk of immediate detection and punishment than the distributor 
of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is false.” Id. at 382. For that reason, Scalia reasoned, 
it is more likely that people will obey a “signing requirement than a naked ‘no falsity’ 
requirement.” Id. Having thus identified themselves, Scalia continued, people will “be 
significantly less likely to lie in what they have signed.” Id. 
 44. Id. at 378–79.  
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might be fairly inferred, therefore, that, consistent with their view that the 
anonymity ban was constitutional, the dissenting justices would have found 
the bans on campaign lies constitutional as well.  
3. United States v. Alvarez  
 Brown and McIntyre dealt directly with the First Amendment’s 
protection of campaign speech but touched only tangentially on lies. 
Conversely, United States v. Alvarez focused directly and comprehensively 
on the First Amendment’s protection of lies generally
45
 but addressed 
campaign lies only briefly and inconclusively in a concurring opinion.
46
 
When introducing himself as a board member of a water district, Xavier 
Alvarez falsely claimed that he held the Congressional Medal of Honor.
47
 
For telling this lie, Alvarez was convicted under the Stolen Valor Act, 
which criminalized falsely claiming that one had been awarded a military 
honor.
48
 In a six to three decision, the Court invalidated the Act on First 
Amendment grounds.
49
 A plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and 
Sonia Sotomayor, began by stating that “content-based restrictions on 
speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the 
few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the 
bar.”
50
 Kennedy then observed that “[a]bsent from these few categories 
where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general 
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”
51
 Particularly 
pertinent to our inquiry, Kennedy stated that even knowing falsehoods or 
falsehoods made with reckless disregard for their truth are not among those 
few categories of expression that may be regulated because of their content 
consistent with the First Amendment.
52
 Accordingly, Kennedy subjected 
the law to “the most exacting scrutiny.”
53
 
Kennedy acknowledged that the government had a “compelling interest” 
in protecting “the integrity of the military honors system in general, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 46. Id. at 738–39 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 47. Id. at 713 (plurality opinion). 
 48. Id. at 713, 715.  
 49. Id. at 715.  
 50. Id. at 718 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010)). For the 
exceptions listed in this opinion, see infra note 277 and accompanying text.  
 51. Id. at 718.  
 52. Id. at 718–19.  
 53. Id. at 724. 
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Congressional Medal of Honor in particular.”
54
 He found, however, that the 
restriction on speech imposed by the Act was not “actually necessary” to 
achieve these interests because the government had “not shown, and cannot 
show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”
55
 In 
addition, Kennedy observed that because the government could provide a 
database listing the Congressional Medal of Honor winners, the speech 
restriction was not the “least restrictive means among available, effective 
alternatives.”
56
 For these reasons, he concluded that the Act did not pass the 
“exacting scrutiny” to which content-based speech restrictions are subject.
57
 
Concurring in the result, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Elena 
Kagan, agreed that the Act was unconstitutional.
58
 Breyer noted that 
“restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social 
sciences, the arts, and the like” present a grave danger of suppressing 
truthful speech and, therefore, such restrictions should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.
59
 But because this case did not involve such a law, but rather one 
that prohibits “false statements about easily verifiable facts that do not 
concern such subject matter,” such exacting scrutiny was inappropriate.
60
 
Recognizing that the Act might nonetheless threaten free speech, he 
subjected it to “intermediate scrutiny.”
61
 Finding that the Act “applies in 
family, social, or other private contexts, where lies will often cause little 
harm,”
62
 as well as in “political contexts, where although such lies are more 
likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also 
high,”
63
 he concluded that the Act was not sufficiently “narrowly 
tailored.”
64
 Breyer suggested, however, that a more “finely tailored” statute 
might be constitutional, for instance, one that “focus[ed] its coverage on 




                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 724–25.  
 55. Id. at 726. 
 56. Id. at 729 (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 
(2004)).  
 57. Id. at 729–30. 
 58. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 59. Id. at 731–32.  
 60. Id. at 732. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 736. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 737. 
 65. Id. at 738. 
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In discussing the narrow tailoring requirement, Breyer had this to say 
about regulation of false electoral speech: 
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts, 
such a narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the 
political arena a false statement is more likely to make a 
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the 
speaker), but at the same time criminal prosecution is 
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential 
election result) and consequently can more easily result in 
censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the statute may 
have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some lower 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparable 
but narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts. Without 
expressing any view on the validity of those cases, I would also 
note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate 
information will normally counteract the lie.
66
 
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas, 
dissented.
67
 Noting the many occasions in which the Court had stated that 
“false statements of fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their 
own sake,”
68
 Alito observed that the Court had also “recognized that it is 
sometimes necessary to ‘exten[d] a measure of strategic protection’ to these 
statements in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing space’ for protected 
speech.”
69
 In Alito’s view, however, “the Stolen Valor Act presents no risk 
at all that valuable speech will be suppressed.”
70
 He explained that the 
Stolen Valor Act stands in “stark contrast to . . . laws prohibiting false 
statements about history, science, and similar matters.”
71
 This is because, 
unlike the Stolen Valor Act, laws prohibiting false statements about 
“matters of public concern” would present a “grave and unacceptable 
danger of suppressing truthful speech.”
72
 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. (citations omitted). 
 67. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 68. Id. at 750. 
 69. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 
(1974)). 
 70. Id. at 752. Nor in Alito’s judgment was the Act subject to facial invalidity on 
overbreadth grounds because of its potential application to private or political speech. In his 
view, there was no showing that the Act was substantially overbroad. Id. at 753. 
 71. Id. at 752. 
 72. Id. at 751. 
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So what does Alvarez tell us about the constitutionality of regulating lies 
in political campaigns? It reveals that after thirty years and a complete 
change of membership since Brown v. Hartlage, the Court is still unsure 
about the constitutionality of laws prohibiting lies in political campaigns. 
Breyer’s opinion is the only one that directly addresses this issue—and it 
expressly reserves judgment.
73
 Significantly, however, Breyer distinguishes 
between false statements about “philosophy, religion, history, the social 
sciences, the arts, and the like” and false statements in “political speech,” 
by which he seems to mean speech in political campaigns.
74
 With respect to 
laws restricting lies in the former category, he would apply “strict scrutiny,” 
which he acknowledges “warrants . . . near-automatic condemnation” of a 
law.
75
 In contrast, he apparently would subject restrictions on false 
statements in electoral contexts to “intermediate scrutiny”—albeit a 
particularly searching version of such scrutiny in light of the “risk of 
censorious selectivity by prosecutors.”
76
 It is also manifest that the 
government would bear the burden of showing why counterspeech would 
be an insufficient remedy. 
Alito’s dissenting opinion similarly appears to hive off false statements 
in political campaigns from other forms of false statements on matters of 
public concern. Thus, Alito states that “any attempt” by government to 
restrict “false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social 
sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern” would “present a 
grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.”
77
 
Noticeably missing from this litany are false statements in political 
campaigns. Indeed, the only mention in Alito’s opinion of campaign speech 
is in a citation to Brown in support of the argument that “false statements of 
fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their own sake,” but “it is 
sometimes necessary to extend a measure of strategic protection to [false] 
statements in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing space’ for protected 
speech.”
78
 As detailed below, the basic thesis of this Article is that, with 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 738–39 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 74. Id. at 731. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 736.  
 77. Id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. at 750–51 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)). The 
parenthetical following the citation to Brown describes the case as “sustaining as-applied 
First Amendment challenge to law prohibiting certain ‘factual misstatements in the course of 
political debate’ where there had been no showing that the disputed statement was made 
‘other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or . . . with reckless disregard 
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respect to the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny, campaign 
speech should be distinguished from public discourse. So it is significant 
that, like Breyer’s concurring opinion, Alito’s dissent leaves open the 
possibility that government may have somewhat greater authority to 
prohibit at least some form of campaign lies than it does to punish 
knowingly false statements about “history, science, and similar matters.”  
In contrast, Kennedy’s plurality opinion would seem implicitly to take a 
harder line against laws prohibiting campaign lies, which manifestly 
regulate speech based on its content. Since, in the plurality’s view, there is 
no categorical exemption from the rule against content discrimination, even 
for intentional or reckless misstatement of fact, any prohibition on 
campaign lies would seem to be subject to strict scrutiny and, thus, “near-
automatic” condemnation.  
There are, however, plausible arguments that, even under the plurality’s 
approach, prohibitions on at least some campaign lies might evade such 
scrutiny. First is the argument advanced by Professor Eugene Volokh: 
because lies by candidates are lies by people “seeking a paying job,” such 
expression is a species of financial fraud, a category of speech the plurality 
recognized as categorically without First Amendment protection.
79
 Another 
such argument arises from the statement in the plurality opinion confirming 
the constitutionality of laws punishing false statements made to law 
enforcement officials, perjury, and false representations that one is speaking 
on behalf of government.
80
 Significantly, these types of expression are not 
(or, at least, not as such)
81
 on the plurality’s list of categories of expression 
exempt from the rule against content discrimination. It is understandable 
that the plurality did not want to imply that laws punishing lies that threaten 
the “integrity of Government processes” are “vulnerable” to First 
Amendment challenge.
82
 But the plurality’s recognition that these types of 
                                                                                                                 
as to whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 751 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 
(1982)).  
 79. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Knowing Falsehoods, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/06/28/freedom-of-speech-
and-knowing-falsehoods/.  
 80. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).  
 81. The plurality suggests that some of this expression might “implicate fraud or speech 
integral to criminal conduct.” Id. at 721. As Eugene Volokh has aptly noted, the “speech 
integral to criminal conduct” exception is “indeterminate, dangerous, and inconsistent with 
more recent cases.” Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2005).  
 82. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721.  
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lies may constitutionally be proscribed because they interfere with the 
integrity of essential government functions invites the argument that certain 
types of electoral lies may similarly be banned consistent with the First 
Amendment because they undermine the integrity of elections, another 
essential government function.  
4. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus  
Nearly two decades after its decision in McIntyre, the Supreme Court 
once again had occasion to discuss Ohio’s ban on false campaign speech in 
a decision finding that an advocacy group had standing to challenge the 
law.
83
 Although the Court again did not expressly comment on the law’s 
constitutionality, the decision nevertheless strongly suggests that the law is 
constitutionally defective.  
The Susan B. Anthony List (SBA), a “pro-life advocacy organization,” 
publicly criticized various members of Congress—including then-
Congressman Steve Driehaus, who voted for the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA)—as supporting taxpayer-funded abortion.
84
 In 
addition to criticizing his vote in a press release, the SBA planned to do so 
on a billboard that would have read: “Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus 
voted FOR taxpayer-funded abortion.”
85
 After Driehaus’s counsel 
threatened legal action, however, the owner of the billboard space refused 
to display that message.
86
 
Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging 
that the claim that he voted for “taxpayer-funded abortion” was a false 
statement in violation of the Ohio’s false statement statute.
87
 A Commission 
panel voted two to one that probable cause existed that a violation had been 
committed and set a hearing before the full commission for ten business 
days later. The SBA then filed suit in federal district court seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the provision of the Election 
Code under which Driehaus brought his complaint violated the First 
Amendment.
88
 The district court stayed the lawsuit pending completion of 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).  
 84. Id. at 2339.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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 The parties then agreed to postpone the full 
Commission hearing until after the election.
90
  
After Driehaus lost the election, he withdrew his complaint, and the 
district court lifted the stay.
91
 The district court consolidated the SBA’s suit 
with a separate suit brought by another advocacy organization, the 
Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST).
92
 COAST 
also wanted to distribute material criticizing Driehaus as voting “to fund 
abortions with tax dollars,” but was deterred from doing so because of the 
complaint against the SBA.
93
 In light of Driehaus’s dropping his complaint 
against the SBA, the district court dismissed both suits as non-justiciable, 
finding that neither sufficiently alleged concrete injury for purposes of 
standing and ripeness.
94
 The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness grounds.
95
  
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas held that the advocacy 
groups’ pre-enforcement challenge to Ohio’s false statement statute was 
justiciable because the groups had alleged sufficiently imminent injury.
96
 
While the opinion focused on the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III 
standing,
97
 Thomas made several observations that are arguably relevant to 
the merits of both the Ohio false statement statute and similar provisions in 
other states. First, in considering whether the challenged law arguably 
proscribed conduct in which the advocacy organizations wanted to engage, 
Thomas observed that the “Ohio false statement law sweeps broadly.”
98
 
Relatedly, he firmly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning concerning 
whether further prosecution of the SBA was likely. The lower court had 
held that, because the statute proscribes only knowingly false statements 
and the SBA had not claimed that it “plan[ned] to lie or recklessly disregard 
the veracity of its speech,”
99
 the possibility of prosecution for statements 
the SBA claimed were truthful was “exceedingly slim.”
100
 Thomas 
observed that, despite the SBA’s insistence that its claims about Driehaus 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 2340. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2343. 
 97. Id. at 2341–46. 
 98. Id. at 2344. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
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were true, a Commission panel had previously found probable cause that 
the SBA’s statements had violated the law.
101
  
It is a fair inference from these observations that the Court was 
concerned about the wide variety of expression within the scope of the Ohio 
law’s prohibition, a worry not cured by the law’s application only to 
knowingly or recklessly false speech. But it is the section of the opinion 
documenting the substantiality of “the threat of future enforcement of the 
false statement statute”
102
 that provides the most insight into how the Court 
might rule on the merits of Ohio’s false statement law or a similar 
prohibition on campaign lies. 
Thomas explained that the threat of future enforcement arising from the 
prosecution of the SBA “is bolstered by the fact that authority to file a 
complaint with the Commission is not limited to a prosecutor or any 
agency” constrained by “explicit guidelines or ethical obligations.”
103
 
Rather, under the Ohio false statement law “‘any person’ with knowledge 
of the purported violation” can file a complaint.
104
 Citing an amicus brief 
filed by Ohio’s attorney general, Thomas found that there is “a real risk” 
that complaints will be filed by political opponents, who will thereby “gain 
a campaign advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a 
statement.”
105
 He explained: 
[C]omplainants may time their submissions to achieve maximum 
disruption of their political opponents while calculating that an 
ultimate decision on the merits will be deferred until after the 
relevant election. Moreover, the target of a false statement 
complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources 
to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the 
crucial days leading up to an election. And where, as here, a 
Commission panel issues a preelection probable-cause finding, 
such a determination itself may be viewed [by the electorate] as 
a sanction by the State.
106
 
It is always risky to make a prediction about how the Court will rule on 
the constitutionality of a law based on comments not focusing on the law’s 
merits. Still, in light of the concerns about the practical operation of Ohio’s 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Id. at 2344–45. 
 102. Id. at 2345. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 2345–46. 
 106. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
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false statement law expressed in an opinion for the entire Court, I will go 
out on a limb and make the following prediction: while the Court may 
remain uncertain about the constitutionality of a narrowly focused 
prohibition on electoral lies that contains adequate procedural safeguards, it 
would likely invalidate any broad restriction on campaign speech that 
allows anyone to file a complaint. Indeed, in striking down laws similar to 
Ohio’s ban on false campaign statements, several lower courts have relied 
extensively on the Court’s opinion in SBA List. 
B. Lower Court Rulings on the Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting False 
Campaign Speech  
1. Vanasco v. Schwartz 
Vanasco v. Schwartz,
107
 decided in 1975, is apparently the first reported 
case to directly rule on the constitutionality of a law prohibiting campaign 
lies.
108
 In 1974, pursuant to a recently enacted New York Election Law, the 
New York State Board of Elections (“the Board”) promulgated a Fair 
Campaign Code (“the Code”).
109
 At issue in the case were three provisions 
of the Code: section 6201.1(d), prohibiting “misrepresentation of any 
candidate’s qualifications,” including “personal vilification” and “scurrilous 
attacks”;
110
 section 6201.1(e), forbidding “misrepresentation of any 
candidate’s position”;
111
 and section 6201.1(f), banning “misrepresentation 
                                                                                                                 
 107. 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 108.  A comprehensive law review article written in 1975 mentions no case involving a 
challenge to the constitutionality of a law regulating false campaign statements other than 
the then-undecided Vanasco suit. See Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 3, at 
1275–76 n.235; cf. Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 122–23 (Cal. 1975) (holding 
injunction against republication of allegedly deceptive campaign literature an 
unconstitutional prior restraint of speech). There were earlier reported cases involving laws 
regulating false campaign statements but none that I have been able to find involved 
constitutional challenges to the law. See, e.g., Effertz v. Schimelpfenig, 291 N.W. 286, 288 
(Minn. 1940) (refusing to void an election under Minnesota’s Corrupt Practices Act because 
the plaintiff failed to prove his opponent’s lies were “material”); State ex rel. Hampel v. 
Mitten, 278 N.W. 431, 436 (Wis. 1938) (refusing to void election because candidate’s 
campaign statements about his opponent’s “moral character” were not susceptible to being 
proven true or false).  
 109. The Code was codified at N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1 (McKinney 1974). See 
Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 88 n.1.  
 110. Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 88 (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(d)).  
 111. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(e)). 
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of a candidate’s party affiliation or party endorsement.”
112
 These 
prohibitions applied “during the course of any campaign for nomination or 
election to public office or party position” to misrepresentations made “by 
means of campaign literature, media advertisements, or broadcasts, public 
speeches, press releases, writings or otherwise.”
113
  
The Code also established detailed procedures for filing complaints and 
answers with the Board and for conducting hearings before the Board. The 
Board was empowered to impose a fine of up to $1000 for each violation; 
to issue a report setting forth its findings; and to institute judicial 
proceedings to enforce its orders,
114
 including seeking an injunction against 
violation of its orders.
115
  
The plaintiffs in this case—Roy Vanasco, Joseph Ferris, and Robert 
Postel—were candidates in the 1974 election for the New York State 
Assembly; each had been sanctioned by the Board for violating the Code.
116
 
The Board had found that since Vanasco was not the candidate of the 
Liberal Party, his use of the phrase “Republican-Liberal” on his campaign 
literature misrepresented his party endorsement in violation of section 
6201.1(f) of the Code.
117
 It found that Ferris misrepresented his opponent’s 
voting record in violation of section 6201.1(e) of the Code.
118
  
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(f)). Also involved in this case was a 
provision prohibiting “attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion or ethnic 
background.” Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(c)).  
 113. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1). The court noted that while the Code refers 
to “misrepresentation,” the New York election law authorizing the Code refers to “deliberate 
misrepresentations.” Id. at 88 n.2. 
 114. Id. at 99. 
 115. Id. at 89 n.5. 
 116. Id. at 89–91.  
 117. Id. at 89. Vanasco argued to the Board that, although he had failed to get enough 
signatures on his nominating petition to be listed on the ballot as the Liberal Party candidate, 
he reasonably and in good faith believed he had the endorsement of that party. Id. at 89 n.3. 
But the Board concluded that, while members of the Liberal Party may have promoted 
Vanasco’s candidacy, he was not in fact the candidate of the Liberal Party, and, thus, his use 
of the phrase “Republican-Liberal” on his campaign literature misrepresented his party 
affiliation. Id. 
 118. Id. at 90. Ferris claimed in a leaflet that his incumbent opponent, Vincent Riccio, 
“voted himself a $17,000 salary increase; received his salary for less than 100 days work; 
opposed increased funds for recreation for the aging and opposed aid to community 
colleges.” Id. at 89. A newspaper also quoted Ferris as stating that Riccio voted for 
gerrymandering the District he represented in the State Assembly. Id. at 89 n.6. In response 
to Riccio’s complaint filed with the Board, Ferris alleged that “(1) Riccio did vote for a 
salary increase but it did not become effective until January 1975; (2) that the New York 
State Assembly is in session less than 100 days a year; (3) Riccio had opposed a bill (other 
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Both of these candidates complied with the Board’s order to surrender 
the offending campaign literature or submit a plan for “re-marking” the 
literature.
119
 Shortly before these orders issued, however, they sued the 
Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York; these plaintiffs sought to convene a three-judge court for the 
purposes of declaring the statute and the Code unconstitutional (both on 
their face and as applied) and enjoining the enforcement of the statute and 
the Code.
120
 The district court dismissed the complaint.
121
 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed the district 
court and ordered that a three-judge court be convened.
122
  
Postel’s case was heard by the same three-judge court.
123
 Postel was 
accused by his opponent, A. B. “Pete” Grannis, of making false 
representations about him.
124
 The Board issued an interim order requiring 
Postel to cease and desist from distributing any literature containing the 
language about which Grannis had complained.
125
 Before the hearing could 
be completed, however, Postel obtained a temporary restraining order from 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
against further proceedings by the Board.
126
 The Court of Appeals then 
                                                                                                                 
than the one he supported) dealing with increased funds for recreation of the aging; and (4) 
Riccio had voted in favor of budgets which had the effect of reducing aid to community 
colleges.” Id. With respect to Ferris’s statement to the press, Riccio claimed that he voted 
against gerrymandering, but Ferris countered that he was referring to an earlier vote. Id. The 
Board found that Ferris had misrepresented Riccio’s voting record and did so “with actual 
knowledge of its falsity and with reckless disregard of its falsity.” Id. at 90 n.7. 
 119. Id. at 89, 90. 
 120. Id. at 90. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 91. 
 124. Id. at 90. As recounted by the court: 
Specifically, Grannis charged that certain Postel campaign literature 
misrepresented that Grannis had a ‘patronage job’ in the State Department of 
Environmental Conservation; received major financial support from 
Republican ‘big whigs’ such as Laurence Rockefeller and Henry Diamond; that 
the New York Court of Appeals had directed a new election after having 
adduced proof that a number of Republicans had voted illegally in a 
Democratic primary; that a complaint against Grannis had been filed with the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and that Grannis was a registered Republican 
in 1973.  
Id. 
 125. Id. at 91. 
 126. Id. 
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ordered the three-judge court convened to hear Vanasco’s and Ferris’s 
claims to consider Postel’s case as well.
127
 
The three-judge district court, in an opinion by Judge Henry F. Werker, 
began its constitutional analysis by declaring that the “regulation of the 
speech of ‘public officers’ and ‘public figures’ during campaigns for 
political office [is] where the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech 
‘has its fullest and most urgent application.’”
128
 Nonetheless, it agreed with 
the Board that “calculated falsehoods are of such slight social value that no 
matter what the context in which they are made, they are not 
constitutionally protected.”
129
 At the same time, the court emphasized that it 
must “bear in mind the necessity for legislators to use only the most 
‘sensitive tools’ in separating legitimate from illegitimate speech so that 
First Amendment freedoms are given the necessary ‘breathing space’ they 
need to survive.”
130
 Finding that the challenged provisions of the Code 
“cast a substantial chill on the expression of protected speech,” the court 




With respect to section 6201.1(d), the court observed that the prohibition 
on “misrepresentation of any candidate’s qualifications” expressly included 
“‘personal vilification’ and ‘scurrilous attacks.’”
132
 The court held that 
while such expression may be offensive, it does not “by that fact alone . . . 
lose its constitutional protection.”
133
 Similarly, with respect to section 
6201.1(f), the court noted that the Board “merely found that [Vanasco] had 
‘misrepresented’ his party endorsement” but did not made a finding that 
“the misrepresentation was deliberate or that it was made with knowledge 
of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.”
134
 This construction by the 
Board “clearly demonstrated” that the provision at issue was “susceptible to 
application to protected speech.”
135
 Finally, with respect to the prohibition 
on “misrepresentation of a candidate’s position” imposed by section 
6201.1(e), the court noted “the often difficult task of trying to define . . . 
what a political candidate’s ‘position’ is on issues discussed during a 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 93 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (first quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) and then quoting 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 131. Id. at 95.  
 132. Id. at 96. 
 133. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1971)). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
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 As a result, “the term ‘misrepresentation’ could be applied to 




The court concluded by recognizing the “state’s legitimate interest in 
insuring fair and honest elections” and conceded that “deliberate calculated 
falsehoods when used by political candidates can lead to public cynicism 
and apathy.”
138
 But due to the “irresistible force of protected expression 
under the First Amendment,” even the important state interest of assuring 
fair and honest elections does not justify the state in “tamper[ing] with what 
it will permit the citizen to see and hear.”
139
 Three years later, another court 
would uphold a narrower ban on the making of false campaign statements.  
2. DeWine v. Ohio Elections Commission 
DeWine v. Ohio Elections Commission, a 1978 decision by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, involved a facial challenge to an Ohio law that made it a 
misdemeanor to “[p]ost, publish, circulate, or distribute a written or printed 
false statement knowing the same to be false concerning a candidate that is 
designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.”
140
 
The challenger was R. Michael DeWine,
141
 a successful candidate in a 1976 
election for county prosecutor.
142
 The Ohio Elections Commission 
determined that statistics DeWine used in his campaign brochure about the 
prosecutorial record of the incumbent prosecutor he defeated were a 
“misleading representation” of his opponent’s record in violation of the 
Ohio law.
143
 Finding that the false statement statute implicated the 
fundamental right of free speech, the court, in an opinion by Judge Alba L. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 97. 
 137. Id. In addition to striking down these three provisions prohibiting 
misrepresentations, the court also invalidated section 6201.1(c), the provision banning 
attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion, or ethnic background. Id. at 94.  
 138. Id. at 100. 
 139. Id. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision. See Schwartz v. Postel, 
423 U.S. 1041 (1976). 
 140. DeWine v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 399 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) 
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3599.091(B)(9) (West 1976)). The law at issue here was the 
predecessor to the one at issue in SBA List. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. 
Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014).  
 141. This was the same person who more than thirty-five years later in his capacity as the 
Attorney General of Ohio filed the amicus brief cited extensively by the United States 
Supreme Court in SBA List. See SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2345–46.  
 142. DeWine, 399 N.E.2d. at 101.  
 143. Id. 
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Whiteside, subjected the law to “close judicial scrutiny.”
144
 It held that there 
was a “very compelling state interest to promote honesty in the election of 
public officers.”
145
 In addition, the court ruled that freedom of speech “does 
not include a right to purposely, with knowledge of its falsity, publish a 
false statement about a candidate for public office.”
146
 For these reasons, 
the court held that the statute was facially constitutional,
147
 allowing the 
prosecution of DeWine to proceed.
148
 Twenty years would pass before there 
would be another major decision on the constitutionality of campaign lies.  
3. State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No! 
Committee 
In 1998, a divided Washington Supreme Court invalidated on its face a 
law prohibiting anyone acting with “actual malice” from sponsoring 
“political advertising that contains a false statement of fact.”
149
 The law 
specified that a violation must be proven by “clear and convincing 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 102. 
 145. Id. at 103. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. The court also found that the trial court erred in holding that the law required that 
the Commission use a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard rather than a preponderance 
of the evidence standard to make a determination that a violation of the law had occurred. Id. 
at 105.  
 148. Seven years later, relying heavily on DeWine, a different division of the court of 
appeals upheld a conviction under this law. See State v. Davis, 499 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1985). Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as had 
the Ohio Supreme Court in DeWine, also rebuffed a facial challenge to the Ohio false 
statements law. See Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573, 577 (1991). In doing 
so, the Sixth Circuit upheld the provision of the law empowering the Commission to 
determine whether a challenged campaign allegation was true or not and to proclaim this 
finding to the electorate. Id. at 579. (This “truth-determining” aspect of this case is discussed 
in more detail infra notes 376–379 and accompanying text.) But while upholding this 
provision, the court invalidated two key provisions of the law: 1) the provision empowering 
the commission to issue fines, on the ground that the law did not require the relevant 
findings to be made by “clear and convincing evidence”; and 2) the provision allowing for 
cease-and-desist orders as authorizing unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. Pestrak, 
926 F.2d at 578. Twenty-five years later, the Sixth Circuit facially invalidated an amended 
version of Ohio’s false statements law. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 
466, 471 (6th Cir. 2016), discussed, infra notes 253–274 and accompanying text. Soon 
thereafter, the Ohio Court of Appeals followed suit, finding the law facially invalid under 
both the First Amendment and the Ohio Constitution. See Magda v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 2016-Ohio-5043, 58 N.E.3d 1188. 
 149. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693 
n.2 (Wash. 1998). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018





 The case arose when the state’s Public Disclosure 
Commission filed charges against the 119 Vote No! Committee, its 
executive director, and its treasurer for statements the Committee published 
criticizing a ballot measure to legalize assisted suicide.
151
 The complaint 
alleged that the Committee’s statements, which asserted that the ballot 
measure included inadequate safeguards, contained materially false 
statements of fact published with actual malice—“that is, with knowledge 
that the statements . . . were false or in reckless disregard of whether the 
statements were false.”
152
 The complaint prayed that the defendants be 
fined up to $10,000 plus costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages.
153
 The 
trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the advertisement did not 
contain materially false statements, and awarded the Committee attorney’s 
fees and costs.
154
 Despite the dismissal, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
which had intervened in the case, sought a declaration that the statute was 
facially invalid.
155
 The trial court declined to invalidate the law.
156
  
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the 
publication did not violate the statute.
157
 The Court was sharply divided, 
however, about the validity of the law, holding five to four that the statute 
was facially unconstitutional. Writing for himself and two other justices, 
Justice Richard Sanders held that, because the law infringes protected 
speech, it must be subject to “exacting scrutiny.”
158
 He rejected the state’s 
“claimed compelling interest to shield the public from falsehoods during a 
political campaign” as “patronizing and paternalistic.”
159
 In Sanders’s view, 
this justification “assumes the people of this state are too ignorant or 
disinterested to investigate, learn, and determine for themselves the truth or 
falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself 
to fill the void.”
160
 He found that the state’s reliance on defamation law was 
misplaced in that defamation law “is designed to protect the property of an 
individual in his or her good name.”
161
 Sanders found the law more 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 693.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 694. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 693, 699, 701.  
 158. Id. at 696–97.  
 159. Id. at 698. 
 160. Id. at 699.  
 161. Id. at 697.  
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comparable to the Sedition Act of 1798’s attempt to suppress seditious 
libel.
162
 Because the law could not be justified by a compelling state interest 
and because it chilled political speech, Sanders concluded the law was 
unconstitutional on its face.
163
  
Justice Barbara Madsen, joined by one other justice, agreed that the law 
was facially unconstitutional because it included speech about a ballot 
measure.
164
 Madsen wrote separately, however, to emphasize that she was 
not convinced that a law prohibiting knowing or reckless falsehoods about 
a candidate would violate the First Amendment.
165
  
Justice Richard Guy, speaking for himself and one other justice, 
disagreed that the law was facially unconstitutional.
166
 Because in his view 
“[c]alculated lies are not protected political speech,” and because such lies 
“do not foster debate; they foster deception,” he disagreed with the majority 
that the law on its face violated the First Amendment.
167
 
Justice Phil Talmadge, joined by one other justice, vehemently disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that the law was facially unconstitutional.
168
 
Condemning the majority for being the “first court in the history of the 
Republic to declare First Amendment protection for calculated lies,” he 
feared that the “sweep of the majority’s rhetoric is so encompassing that no 
statute designed to ensure statements of fact in political campaigns are 
truthful would survive a First Amendment challenge.”
169
 Relying on United 
States Supreme Court dicta that deliberate falsehoods are not protected 
speech,
170
 Talmadge disagreed with the majority that regulation of 
campaign lies need be justified by a compelling state interest.
171
 In any 
event, in his view, “ensuring the integrity of the electoral process, for ballot 
measures as well as for election of candidates,” constitutes a compelling 
state interest.
172
 In addition, he found that the “chilling effect of the statute 
on free speech is infinitesimal, if it exists at all,” in that it does not reach 
“hyperbole or rhetoric [or] polemic” but only “the calculating liar.”
173
 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 696.  
 163. Id. at 699.  
 164. Id. (Madsen, J., concurring).  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. (Guy, J., concurring).  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring).  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 703–04.  
 171. Id. at 707. 
 172. Id. at 708.  
 173. Id. at 707.  
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In light of Madsen’s concurring opinion, in 1999 the Washington 
legislature amended the statute to apply only to “a false statement of 
material fact about a candidate for public office,” excluding statements that 
a candidate or the candidate’s agent makes about himself or herself.
174
 The 
amended law, however, was also invalidated on its face by a sharply 
divided Washington Supreme Court. 
4. Rickert v. State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission  
The validity of the amended law came before the Washington Supreme 
Court in 2007 after a candidate for the Washington State Senate published a 
campaign brochure charging that her opponent, the incumbent, had voted to 
close a facility for the developmentally disabled.
175
 The Public Disclosure 
Commission found that this charge was false in that the facility was not for 
the developmentally disabled and that the incumbent had not voted to close 
the facility.
176
 Finding that the statement was made with “actual malice,” 
the Commission imposed a penalty of $1000 on the candidate.
177
  
A plurality opinion by Justice James Johnson joined by three other 
justices (including Justice Sanders) expressed basically the same views as 
Sanders’s opinion in 119 Vote No! Committee. Quoting from that case, 
Johnson wrote that the claim that the state “may prohibit false statement of 
fact in political advertisements . . . presupposes the State possesses an 
independent right to determine truth and falsity in political debate,” a 
proposition that Johnson found “fundamentally at odds with the principles 
embodied in the First Amendment.”
178
 In addition, he found this claim 
“naively assumes that the government is capable of correctly and 
consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political 
speech,” when “political speech is usually as much opinion as fact.”
179
 For 
this reason, “every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the 




                                                                                                                 
 174. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (1999) (currently codified at WASH REV. CODE 
§ 42.17A.335 (2012)). 
 175. Rickert v. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007). 
 176. Id. at 828. 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 829. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 
P.2d 691, 695 (1998)). 
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Because the law was a content-based restriction on political speech, 
Johnson subjected it to strict scrutiny.
181
 He found that the stated purpose of 
the law—“to provide protection for candidates for public office” beyond the 
reputational protection provided by defamation law—is not a compelling 
state interest.
182
 He then turned to the interest in “preserving the integrity of 
the election process.”
183
 Distinguishing content-based restrictions on speech 
that the United States Supreme Court had upheld—measures “protecting 
the election poll area” or “avoiding voter confusion by avoiding ballot 
overcrowding by multiple candidates with little support”—Johnson found 
that the prohibition on false factual statements about candidates did not 
prevent “direct harm to elections.”
184
 In holding the law unconstitutional, 
Johnson explained that the “election system already contains the solution to 
the problem that [the law in question] is meant to address”: “[t]he preferred 
First Amendment remedy of ‘more speech,’ not enforced silence.’”
185
  
The deciding vote was cast by Chief Justice Gerry Alexander. In a brief 
concurring opinion, he distanced himself from the plurality’s opinion, 
which he read as concluding that “any government censorship of political 
speech,” including prohibitions on defamation, “would run afoul of the First 
Amendment.”
186
 But because the law at issue “prohibits nondefamatory 
speech in addition to defamatory speech,” Alexander agreed that it was 
overbroad and, thus, facially unconstitutional.
187
  
Justice Madsen, joined by three other justices, dissented.
188
 Consistent 
with her opinion in 119 Vote No! Committee, she found that deliberate 
falsehoods about a candidate for public offices are not “protected 
speech.”
189
 Accordingly, she found that a law proscribing such expression 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 829–30. Johnson also found the law not “narrowly tailored” because of the 
exemption of a candidate’s speech about himself or herself. Id. at 831. 
 183. Id. at 830. 
 184. Id. at 830–31. 
 185. Id. at 832 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982)). Johnson also found 
that various “faulty procedural mechanisms,” including that members of the Commission are 
appointed by the governor, “a political officer,” confirmed that the law was not narrowly 
tailored. Id. at 831–32. Johnson acknowledged—but not without a warning that such 
holdings “should be neither admired or emulated”—that some courts have upheld statutes 
restricting false campaign speech. Id. at 827. The sole case cited by Johnson is Pestrak v. 
Ohio Elections Commission, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). Id. at 827 n.3. (Pestrak is 
discussed infra notes 375–378 and accompanying text.)  
 186. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 832 (Alexander, C.J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 833. 
 188. Id. (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. (stating that “the use of calculated falsehood is not constitutionally protected”). 
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to protect the reputational interests of candidates comported with the First 
Amendment.
190
 Madsen regarded the court’s decision as “an invitation to lie 
with impunity,” adding that it is “little wonder that so many view political 
campaigns with distrust and cynicism.”
191
  
5. 281 Care Committee v. Arneson 
281 Care Committee v. Arneson
192
—decided by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2014—was the first major decision on the 
constitutionality of false campaign laws to be decided after United States v. 
Alvarez. The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Minnesota Fair 
Campaign Practices Act, under which it was a gross misdemeanor to make 
a knowingly false statement about a ballot proposition.
193
 Pursuant to this 
provision, anyone could lodge a complaint with the Minnesota Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH), which could impose a civil penalty of up 
to $5000.
194
 In addition, after the administrative proceedings were 
complete, the complaint was subject to criminal prosecution by the county 
attorney.
195
 The provision was challenged in federal district court on First 
Amendment grounds by two advocacy organizations founded to oppose 
school funding ballot initiatives.
196
 Finding that the law served the 
compelling interests of preserving fair and honest elections and preventing 
fraud upon the electorate, the district court rejected the challenge.
197
  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge C. Arlen Bean, 
disagreed and held the statute unconstitutional.
198
 In light of Alvarez’s 
teaching that “false statements do not represent a category of speech 
altogether exempt from First Amendment protection”
199
 and because the 
challenged provision was a content-based regulation of “political speech” 
occupying “the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment,” 
the court subjected the law to strict scrutiny.
200
 In doing so, the court 
pretermitted deciding whether “preserving fair and honest elections and 
preventing fraud on the electorate” qualified as a compelling state 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. at 835. 
 191. Id. at 833. 
 192. 766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 193. Id. at 777–78. 
 194. Id. at 778. 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. at 777. The leaders of the organizations were also plaintiffs in this action. Id. 
 197. Id. at 779. 
 198. Id. at 795–96. 
 199. Id. at 783 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)). 
 200. Id. at 784.  
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 It instead focused on whether the provision was “narrowly 
tailored,” concluding that it was not.
202
  
To be narrowly tailored, the court explained, a regulation must: (1) 
“actually advance” the compelling state interest; (2) be neither over-
inclusive nor under-inclusive; and (3) be the least-restrictive alternative.
203
 
The court found that Minnesota’s false statement law failed each of these 
requirements. With respect to the first requirement, the court faulted the 
state for failing to adduce any empirical evidence that there are “actual, 
serious threats of individuals disseminating knowingly false statements 
concerning ballot initiatives.”
204
 More damningly, the court found that the 
law did not actually advance the interest in preserving fair and honest 
elections because the provision “tend[ed] to perpetuate the very fraud it is 
allegedly designed to prohibit.”
205
  
To support this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, which, in the court’s 
view, “illuminated the many abuses that emanate” from prohibitions on 
false campaign statements.
206
 It noted that, like the Ohio law at issue in SBA 
List, “it is immensely problematic that anyone may lodge a complaint with 
the OAH” alleging a violation of the Minnesota law.
207
 As a result, like the 
Ohio law, complaints under the Minnesota law can be filed “at a tactically 
calculated time so as to divert the attention of an entire campaign from the 
meritorious task at hand of supporting or defeating a ballot question.”
208
 In 
addition, the complaint can result in “possibly diffusing public sentiment 




The court also found the Minnesota law both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive. Again focusing on the ability of anyone to file a complaint, the 
court found that, while only knowingly false factual assertions may be 
within the literal scope of the law, the proceedings confirmed that “there is 
nothing to prohibit the filing of a complaint against speech that may later be 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. at 787. 
 202. Id. at 787–96. 
 203. Id. at 787 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F. 3d 738, 751 (8th Cir. 
2005)). 
 204. Id. at 787. 
 205. Id. at 789. 
 206. Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2344–46 (2014)). 
 207. Id. at 790. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
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 By the time the OAH starts the process of 
weeding out unmeritorious claims, however, “damage is done, the extent 
which remains unseen.”
211
 For this reason, the court found the law over-
inclusive.
212
 At the same time, it found the prohibition under-inclusive due 
to its exemption of “news items or editorial comments by the news media” 
and its limitation to “paid political advertising or campaign material.”
213
 
Finally, the court found that the state had “not offered persuasive 
evidence” to show why the less restrictive means of “counterspeech” would 
not as effectively accomplish the state’s asserted compelling interest in 
promoting fair and honest elections.
214
 Echoing a sentiment expressed 
decades earlier by Justice Sanders in 119 Vote No! Committee, the court 
concluded its opinion by insisting that “[t]he citizenry, not the government, 
should be the monitor of falseness in the political arena. Citizens can digest 
and question writings and broadcasts in favor or against ballot 
initiatives . . . .”
215
  
6. Commonwealth v. Lucas 
Commonwealth v. Lucas, a remarkable case heard by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, involved the criminal prosecution of a 
political action committee leader for distributing literature critical of a 
candidate for public office.
216
 In October 2014, Jobs First Independent 
Expenditure Political Action Committee (“Jobs First”) distributed 
brochures critical of Brian Mannal, an incumbent candidate for the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives.
217
 The brochures included the 
following statements: 
Brian Mannal chose convicted felons over the safety of our 
families. Is this the kind of person we want representing us? 
Helping Himself: Lawyer Brian Mannal has earned nearly 
$140,000 of our tax dollars to represent criminals. Now he wants 
to use our tax dollars to pay defense lawyers like himself to help 
convicted sex offenders. 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 792. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 794. 
 214. Id. at 793. 
 215. Id. at 796. 
 216. 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1244–45 (Mass. 2015). 
 217. Id. at 1245. 
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Approximately two weeks prior to the 2014 general election, Mannal 
filed an application for a criminal complaint in state court against Melissa 
Lucas, the chairwoman and treasurer of Jobs First, alleging that she 
published knowingly false statements in violation of Massachusetts law 
prohibiting false campaign statements.
219
 Mannal coordinated this filing 
with a press conference at which he detailed the reasons for the complaint 
and suggested that the brochures “could put [Lucas] behind bars.”
220
 Lucas 
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Massachusetts 
false statement law was unconstitutional.
221
 A probable cause hearing was 
set for approximately two weeks after the election.
222
 Mannal won 
reelection by 205 votes.
223
 After the probable cause hearing, a magistrate 
issued a complaint formally charging Lucas with violating the false 
statement law.
224
 Lucas then petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts for relief from the criminal complaint on the ground that the 
false statement law was unconstitutional.
225
 The high court, in an opinion 
by Justice Robert J. Cordy, unanimously agreed, finding the law 
“antagonistic to the fundamental right of free speech,” and ordered that the 
criminal complaint against Lucas be dismissed.
226
  
                                                                                                                 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. The law in question provided: 
 No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made or published, any 
false statement in relation to any candidate for nomination or election to public 
office, which is designed or tends to aid or to injure or defeat such candidate. 
 No person shall publish or cause to be published in any letter, circular, 
advertisement, poster or in any other writing any false statement in relation to 
any question submitted to the voters, which statement is designed to affect the 
vote on said question. 
 Whoever knowingly violates any provision of this section shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not 
more than six months. 
MASS GEN. LAWS, ch. 56, § 42 (2016), quoted in Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1244–45 n.1.  
 220. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1245.  
 221. Id.  
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1246. 
 225. Id.  
 226. Id. at 1257. The court rested its holding on the free speech guarantee of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights rather than on First Amendment grounds. See id. at 
1252. But the court relied primarily on First Amendment jurisprudence in finding that the 
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Like the United States Supreme Court in SBA List and the Eighth Circuit 
in 281 Care Committee, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was 
acutely aware of the potential for broad restrictions on campaign lies to be 
used strategically for political gain. The state argued that the complaint 
against Lucas should be dismissed on statutory rather than constitutional 
grounds because the statements at issue were opinions beyond the scope of 
the law.
227
 In response, the court explained that even if the statute were 
confined to false statements of fact, it could still be misused.
228
 It pointed 
out that in the case at hand a candidate used the filing of an application for a 
criminal complaint “as a political tool not only to discredit the statements 
[in Jobs First’s brochure] but also to persuade [Jobs First] to refrain from 
airing a political advertisement shortly before the election. . . . . Thus even 
if the application had been dismissed, the damage was already done.”
229
 
The court also emphasized that “anyone may initiate a complaint . . . and, in 
so doing, create lingering uncertainties of a criminal investigation and chill 
political speech by virtue of the process itself.”
230
 
Having rejected the state’s argument for avoiding the constitutional 
issue, the court considered whether the regulated speech fell within either 
the fraud or defamation exception to the constitutional protection of free 
speech.
231
 With regard to fraud, the court explained that “any legitimate 
interest in preventing electoral fraud must be done by narrowly drawn laws 
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First 
Amendment freedoms.”
232
 Because the false statement law did not require a 
showing of reliance or damages, which the court deemed to be essential 
elements of fraud, it found the law reached not just fraud but expression 
that is not fraudulent.
233




                                                                                                                 
false campaign statement law violated the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as lower court 
cases holding that false statement laws in other states violate the First Amendment. See id. at 
1252–57. 
 227. Id. at 1246. 
 228. Id. at 1247–48. 
 229. Id. at 1247 (citing 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 776 F.3d 774, 790 n.12 (8th Cir. 
2014)). 
 230. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
 231. Id. at 1248. 
 232. Id. at 1249. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 316 n.2 (2008) (Souter, J., 
dissenting)). In a footnote, the court mentions the state’s argument that a false factual 
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The court found the state’s attempt to “shoehorn” the false statement law 
into the defamation exemption to be similarly flawed.
235
 It observed that 
while some false campaign speech might be defamatory, other types of 
false campaign speech, such as candidates’ statements about themselves or 
comments about a ballot proposition, are not capable of being 
defamatory.
236
 Accordingly, because the false statement law regulated 
protected speech, the court subjected the law to strict scrutiny.
237
 
Applying strict scrutiny, the court stated that “[a]s a general matter” it 
agreed that the state has a “compelling interest in the maintenance of free 
and fair elections.”
238
 It added that this interest includes “preserving the 
integrity of its election process”
239
 such as by “thwart[ing] political 
corruption, voter intimidation, and election fraud.”
240
 This did not mean, 
however, that the state has “carte blanche to regulate the dissemination of 
false statements during political campaigns.”
241
 In particular, the state’s 
“claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions 
by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some 
skepticism.”
242
 The court found such skepticism well founded because the 
state did not establish that the law was “actually . . . necessary to serve the 
compelling interest in fair and free elections.”
243
 To the contrary, the court 
                                                                                                                 
statement might be unprotected even in the absence of a showing of concrete harm if it 
threatens the “integrity of Government processes.” Id. at 1249 n.8 (quoting Alvarez, 567 
U.S. at 721). The court rejected that argument because the state did not show that the range 
of speech prohibited by the false campaign statement law posed “an actual and substantial 
threat to the electoral process.” Id.  
 235. Id. at 1249. 
 236. Id. at 1250. 
 237. Id. The court noted the argument that Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez 
mandates the application of intermediate scrutiny to laws outlawing false statements of fact 
but opined that the opinion “abrogated the well-established line of First Amendment 
precedent holding that content-based restrictions on political speech must withstand strict 
scrutiny.” Id. at 1251. Because “the applicable standard for content-based restrictions on 
political speech is clearly strict scrutiny” under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 
however, it applied that standard to the false statement law. Id. at 1251–52.  
 238. Id. at 1252. 
 239. Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 
(1989)). 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id. (quoting 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 766 F.3d, 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2014)). 
 242. Id. (quoting 281 Care Committee, 766 F. 3d at 787). 
 243. Id. at 1252. 
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Finally, the court addressed what it called the “rather remarkable 
argument” that the state has broader power to restrict speech in the election 
context than it does with respect to speech generally.
245
 The court 
responded that, to the contrary, “First Amendment rights of speech and 
association have their ‘fullest and most urgent application precisely to the 
conduct of campaigns for political office.’”
246
 It then dealt with the state’s 
specific argument, bolstered by language in McIntyre, that “the state 
interest in preventing fraud carries special weight during election 
campaigns”
247
 and that the Massachusetts false statement law “reaches 
falsehoods far more insidious and difficult to discredit on the eve of an 
election than, for example, the lie uttered in Alvarez.”
248
 The court 
acknowledged the point that the “the shortened time frame of an election” 
may make counterspeech an ineffective remedy.
249
 Still, this distinction 
could not save the law at issue because it was not “narrowly tailored” to 
address this problem.
250
 Rather, the Massachusetts false statement law 
applied not only to the election of public officers, but also to ballot issues, 
and not only to statements widely disseminated through commercial 
advertisement, “but also those exchanged between two friends engaged in a 
spirited political discussion in a local pub.”
251
 In addition, the law applied 
“to a broad range of content that does not pose a realistic threat to the 
maintenance of fair and free elections.”
252
 
7. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus 
In 2014, shortly after the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs had 
Article III standing to pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Ohio’s false 
                                                                                                                 
 244. Id. at 1253. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 1253–54 (quoting Weld for Governor v. Dir. of the Office of Campaign & 
Political Fin., 556 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1990)). In making this statement, the court failed to 
mention Justice Scalia’s observation in his dissent in McIntyre that “protection of the 
election process justifies limitations upon speech that cannot constitutionally be imposed 
generally.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 247. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1254 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349). 
 248. Id. at 1254. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. at 1255. 
 252. Id. 
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 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio ruled on the merits of the challenge, holding the law to be an 
unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment.
254
 In 2016, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this 
decision.
255
 The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by determining the proper 
level of scrutiny to apply to the law.
256
 Finding it to be a content-based 
regulation of “core-protected” political speech, the court applied strict 
scrutiny.
257
 The court agreed that the state’s interests “in preserving the 
integrity of its elections, protecting ‘voters from confusion and undue 
influence,’ and ‘ensuring that an individual’s vote is not undermined by 
fraud in the election process’” are compelling.
258
 But for five reasons, it 




First, the court found that the timing of the administrative process 
established by the law “does not necessarily promote fair elections.”
260
 The 
court noted that while the law provides for expedited procedures for 
complaints filed close to an election, “complaints filed outside this 
timeframe are free to linger for six months.”
261
 And even with the expedited 
procedure, there is no guarantee that proceedings would conclude before 
the election “or within time for the candidate’s campaign to recover from 
any false information that was disseminated.”
262
 As a result, “candidates 
filing complaints against their political opponents count on the fact that ‘an 
ultimate decision on the merits will be deferred until after the relevant 
election.’”
263
 The court held that a final finding occurring after the election 
“does not preserve the integrity of the election,” and, therefore, that the law 
was not narrowly tailored to promote this interest.
264
 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014); see also supra notes 
83–106 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d. 765 (2014). 
 255. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (2016).  
 256. Id. at 472. 
 257. Id. at 473. 
 258. Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
 259. Id. at 474. 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
 263. Id. at 474 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2346 
(2014)). 
 264. Id. 
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Second, the court faulted the law’s procedural mechanism for failing to 
screen out frivolous complaints prior to a probable cause hearing.
265
 As a 
result, “some complainants use the law’s process ‘to gain a campaign 
advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a statement . . . 
tim[ing] their submissions to achieve maximum disruption [and] . . . 
forc[ing political opponents] to divert significant time and resources . . . in 
the crucial days leading up to an election.’”
266
 In this way, too, the process 
was not narrowly tailored to promote Ohio’s interest in preserving fair 
elections.
267
 A third reason the court found the law not narrowly tailored to 




A fourth flaw the court found with the law was that it applied not just to 
the speaker of the false statements, but also to “anyone who advertises, 
‘post[s], publish[es], circulate[s], distribute[s], or otherwise disseminate[s]’ 
false political speech.”
269
 As such, the law applied to commercial 
intermediates, such as the billboard company dissuaded in this case from 
accepting the SBA List’s advertisement.
270
 “Conducting hearings against or 
prosecuting a billboard company executive, who was simply the 




Fifth, and finally, the court found the law to be both over- and under-
inclusive.
272
 It was over-inclusive because “[c]ausing damage to a campaign 
that ultimately may not be in violation of the law” does not preserve the 
integrity of elections, but rather “undermines the state’s interest in 
promoting fair elections.”
273
 And it was under-inclusive because “the law 
may not timely penalize those who violate it, nor does it provide for 
campaigns that are the victim of potentially damaging false statements.”
274
 
                                                                                                                 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 475 (quoting SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2346).  
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. For good measure, the court added that the false statement laws “ha[d] similar 
features” to the Ohio law prohibiting anonymous leafleting that the Supreme Court struck 
down in McIntyre. Id. at 476. The court noted that the “Supreme Court struck down Ohio’s 
election law because its prohibitions included non-material statements that were ‘not even 
arguably false or misleading,’ made by candidates, campaign supporters, and individuals 
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* * * 
In summary, in contrast to the mixed results of earlier cases, recent lower 
court decisions have uniformly found broad bans on lies in political 
campaigns to violate the First Amendment. This is true whether the 
challenged law governs ballot measures, candidate elections, or both. 
Moreover, relevant Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest that the Court 
would reach the same conclusion about a general ban on campaign lies. The 
open question concerns narrowly focused bans such as those forbidding 
intentionally false or misleading statements about election procedures or 
requirements or about incumbency or party affiliation. Whether such laws 
comport with the First Amendment depends on the scope of the rule against 
content discrimination—the central question explored in Part II.  
II. The Basic Structure of American Free Speech Doctrine 
The ability of government to punish campaign lies consistent with the 
First Amendment depends in large part on how one views the basic 
structure of American free speech doctrine. Under a commonly held view, 
aptly dubbed the All-Inclusive Approach, the First Amendment generally 
protects human expression—in all of its manifestations and wherever it may 
occur—from government-imposed content regulation. On this view, 
government has little or no authority to regulate election lies. An alternative 
view, which I shall call the Domain-Specific Approach, posits that the 
government’s ability to regulate the content of speech depends on the 
setting or domain in which the speech occurs. On this view, at least some 
speech occurring in the election domain, including some types of lies, 
might be subject to punishment. As I shall demonstrate, the Domain-
Specific Approach more accurately describes the actual structure of free 
speech doctrine than does the All-Inclusive Approach.  
A. The All-Inclusive Approach 
Under the All-Inclusive Approach, “as a general matter, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
275
 
                                                                                                                 
acting independently and using only their own modest resources,” whether made “on the eve 
of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, or months in advance.” Id. (quoting 
McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334, 351–52 (1995)). In the court’s view, Ohio’s false statement 
laws “ha[d] all of the same flaws” and, therefore, were “not narrowly tailored to preserve 
fair elections.” Id. 
 275. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Alvarez exemplifies the All-Inclusive 
Approach: “content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a 
general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional 
categories of expression long familiar to the bar.”
276
 The exceptions noted 
by Justice Kennedy are “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent 
lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, 
so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and 
speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the 
power to prevent.”
277
 So, on this view, while government has a great deal of 
leeway to regulate speech for reasons unrelated to its message (such as the 
time, place, or manner of the speech),
278
 content-based regulations are 
subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.”
279
 For content-based laws to be 
justified under this test, the government must prove that they are “narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”
280
 Application of such “strict 
scrutiny” almost always results in the regulation being declared invalid.
281
 
As noted above, laws regulating electoral lies unquestionably do so 
based on the content of the speech; thus, under the All-Inclusive Approach, 
the government would have an exceedingly difficult burden to justify the 
prohibition of electoral lies. 
The All-Inclusive Approach is supported by statements in other Supreme 
Court decisions
282
 as well as by prominent commentators.
283
 But as has 
                                                                                                                 
 276. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012). 
 277. Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted). 
 278. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 279. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (“Our 
precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage 
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”) 
 280. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 281. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). (“[I]t is the rare case in 
which a State demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling interest.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (noting that strict scrutiny implies “near automatic condemnation” of the law 
under review); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 314 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“Under strict scrutiny [a law], for the most part, cannot survive.”); McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing strict 
scrutiny as “ordinarily the kiss of death”); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1304 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that 
strict scrutiny will permit infringements of preferred rights only to avert rare, catastrophic 
harms. The Court has frequently described the freedom of speech in terms that make its 
claims sound almost categorically unyielding.”). 
 282. E.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).  
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been aptly observed, the position that there is “a general, ‘normal’ 
conception of free speech right[s] that applies the same in nearly all 
contexts” is, upon close examination, “long on rhetoric and short on 
substance.”
284
 Any such view is inconsistent with both the scope and level 
of protection actually provided to speech in American society. In addition 
to the “narrow categories of expression” that the proponents of the All-
Inclusive Approach acknowledge can be prohibited because of their 
content, there is in fact an enormous range of speech routinely regulated on 
account of its content, all without a hint of interference from the First 
Amendment. This includes expression regulated by securities, antitrust, 
labor, copyright, food and drug, and health and safety laws, together with 
the array of speech regulated by the common law of contract and 
negligence.
285
 In addition, there are numerous Supreme Court holdings 
providing less-than-strict scrutiny to content-based regulation of expression 
beyond the “narrow exceptions” recognized by the All-Inclusive Approach, 
including commercial speech; sexually explicit (but non-obscene) speech; 
                                                                                                                 
 283. For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky asserts:  
[T]here are some categories of speech that are unprotected or less protected by 
the First Amendment, such as incitement or illegal activity, obscenity, and 
defamation. These categories, by definition, are content-based. But apart from 
these categories, content-based discrimination must meet strict scrutiny, and the 
Court has recently indicated that content-based distinctions within these 
categories must also pass strict scrutiny.  
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 933 (3d ed. 2006); 
see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1254 (8th ed. 
2010) (“If the government wants to punish speech based on its content apart from these 
categories, the government bears a heavy burden of proving that its regulation is one that is 
narrowly drawn to promote . . . a compelling government interest.”); Andrew Koppelman, 
Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 662 (2016) 
(“Content-based restrictions (unless they fall within one of the categories of unprotected 
speech) are invalid unless necessary to a compelling state interest.”). 
 284. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1819–20 (1999). 
 285. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768, 1778–84 (2003); see 
also James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment 
Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1097–98 (2004) 
[hereinafter Weinstein, Speech Categorization]. To adopt Schauer’s useful terminology, this 
speech is not just devoid of protection, but because its regulation “does not present a First 
Amendment issue at all,” it is outside First Amendment “coverage.” Schauer, supra at 1769. 
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and speech in a non-public forum.
286
 Of particular importance to our 
inquiry, the government routinely regulates the content of speech in settings 
over which it exercises managerial control, such as the courtroom, the 
government workplace, and the public school classroom.
287
 Contrary to the 
assumption underlying the All-Inclusive Approach, then, there is in fact no 
general rule against content regulation of speech. 
B. The Domain-Specific Approach 
In contrast, the Domain-Specific Approach readily accounts for these 
numerous examples of permissible content regulation. It postulates that the 
prohibition against content regulation is primarily confined to expression 
essential to democratic self-governance—expression that the Court and 
commentators often refer to as “public discourse.”
288
  
1. The Domain of Public Discourse and the Right to Lie
289
 
It is in the domain of public discourse that the people—the ultimate 
governors in a democracy—can freely examine and discuss the rules, 
norms, and conditions that constitute society. Such expression includes 
more than “political speech in the narrow sense”: it also embraces more 
generally “speech concerning the organization and culture of society.”
290
 
                                                                                                                 
 286. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American 
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 492 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory 
Democracy].  
 287. See Weinstein, Speech Categorization, supra note 285, at 1097. 
 288. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971); Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, 
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990). Since this democratic 
expression is not always aimed at the public, however, but also includes informal 
conversations between two friends or a small group of individuals, the term “democratic 
discourse” is more descriptive. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis 
of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 642 (2011) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, A Reply]. However, since the term “public discourse” is commonly used to 
describe this domain, I will use that term in this Article.  
 289. This section of the Article draws substantially from material previously published in 
James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First 
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (2018). 
 290. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 189 (2005). There is no simple algorithm for 
determining whether expression qualifies as public discourse entitled to rigorous protection 
from content discrimination. It is possible nonetheless to identify two factors that are crucial 
to making this determination: (1) whether the speech is about a matter of public concern; and 
(2) whether the expression occurs in settings dedicated or essential to democratic self-
governance, such as on the internet or in books, magazines, films, or public forums such as 
the speaker’s corner of the park. For a more extensive discussion of methodology by which 
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Within this domain, every proposition is open to question. For if 
government were allowed to manage the content of this discussion, either 
by excluding certain ideas as wrong or offensive or even by setting the 
agenda, the opinion formed by public discussion would not reflect the 
independent will of the people, but would rather reflect the preferences of 
those temporarily entrusted to govern society.
291
 In this domain, even the 
most minimal of civility norms may not be enforced for fear that such 
regulation will inevitably reflect the cultural or political norms of some 
particular community when it is these very norms that are up for debate.
292
 
Thus, in this domain, a speaker is allowed to use words or symbols of the 
speaker’s choosing, even highly inflammatory ones.
293
 And of particular 
relevance for our inquiry, in this domain, government is generally 
prohibited from punishing even knowing misstatements of fact. 
Public discourse promotes vital democratic interests of both speakers and 
audience. 
a) Speaker Interests  
The opportunity to participate in public discourse is vital to the 
legitimacy of the legal system in that it allows individuals to have their say 
about laws that bind them.
294
 There may be no fully satisfactory answer to 
the age-old question of what justifies the state’s use of force to make free 
and autonomous people obey laws with which they reasonably disagree. 
                                                                                                                 
the Court has drawn the boundaries of public discourse, see Weinstein, A Reply, supra note 
288, at 639–41. 
 291. As James Madison declared in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1789, 
denouncing the Alien & Sedition Act: “The people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty.” See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)). 
 292. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 
(1971). 
 293. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2355, 2371 (2000) (“Even irrational and abusive speech can, 
within particular circumstances, serve as a vehicle for the construction of democratic 
legitimacy.”). 
 294. For an extensive discussion of how the opportunity to participate in public discourse 
as speakers promotes political legitimacy, see James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, 
Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017) [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans]; James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A 
Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011); see also Thomas Scanlon, A 
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 214 (1972) (arguing that for a 
government to be legitimate, citizens must be able to recognize its authority “while still 
regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents”). 
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But the democratic process—in particular, the ability to vote for 
representatives who enact the laws and the opportunity to freely criticize or 
support laws that representatives are considering enacting—is “arguably the 
best that can be done . . . for justifying the legitimacy of the social order.”
295
 
In addition to promoting legitimacy in this essential, normative sense, the 
opportunity to participate in public discourse contributes to “the descriptive 
conditions necessary for a diverse and heterogeneous population to live 




Crucially, the opportunity to freely and openly participate in public 
discourse promotes not just the legitimacy of the entire legal system, but 
also the legitimacy of particular laws. In a recent article, I discussed, for 
instance, how restrictions on peoples’ ability to use what other democracies 
would consider unlawful “hate speech” to oppose antidiscrimination 
measures will diminish—or may, under certain circumstances, even 




As vital to democracy and political legitimacy as the right to participate 
in public discourse may be, these interests do not, at least as a theoretical 
matter, entail a right of a speaker to try to deceive the public by proclaiming 
as fact something the speaker knows to be untrue. Pragmatically, however, 
there is good reason not to entrust government officials with the power to 
determine the truth or falsity of factual claims made in the often highly 
ideological context of public discourse, especially when the claims are 
factually complex or uncertain.
298
 There is even greater reason to distrust 
the ability of government officials to fairly and accurately determine the 
speaker’s state of mind in making the allegedly false statement. 
Specifically, government officials hostile to the speaker’s point of view 
are more likely to believe that the speaker knew that the statement was 
false, while officials who share the speaker’s ideological perspective will be 
more likely to find that any misstatement of fact was an innocent one. For 
                                                                                                                 
 295. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 262, 263 
(2011). 
 296. Robert Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 651, 651 (2017).  
 297. See Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 294, at 566–74. 
 298. “[Our] forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false 
for us.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). For examples 
of factual misstatements on complex, highly contentious issues of public concern, see James 
Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful, 
but Will It Work in Practice?, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 395–96 (2011). 
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this reason, I shudder at the thought of authorities in Alabama having the 
power to prosecute an abortion rights activist because they have concluded 
that the speaker intentionally made false or misleading statements about 
how often partial-birth abortion is medically necessary; I similarly recoil at 
the thought of California officials prosecuting an anti-abortion activist for 
falsely misrepresenting the extent to which abortion causes depression. It is 
no answer that judges, at trial and on appeal, provide a safeguard against 
speakers being wrongfully punished for making knowing misstatements of 
fact in public discourse. For one, in highly ideological cases even judges are 
subject to “judicial viewpoint discrimination.”
299
 But even if the speaker is 
ultimately vindicated, defending against a prosecution or even an 
investigation can be an expensive and arduous process. 
As discussed in more detail below, it may be true that, even when the 
serious pragmatic problems just described are accounted for, allowing 
government some limited power to punish knowingly false factual 
statements in public discourse would improve the quality of public debate. 
But the core speaker interest protected by the First Amendment is not 
principally concerned with the quality of public discussion; rather, its focus 
is the legitimacy that the opportunity to participate in public discourse 
confers on the legal system. So despite any improvement in the quality of 
public discourse, prosecuting lies in this domain will likely deter speakers 
from making honest but mistaken claims on highly contentious matters of 
public concern. As a result, the legitimacy of the legal system would be 
diminished. For this reason, consistent with what seems to be the view of 
all nine justices in Alvarez, the core democratic value underlying the First 
Amendment ordinarily protects an individual from legal sanction for 
making even intentional misrepresentations of fact in public discourse. 
Suppose that Alan, a popular libertarian blogger with a scientific 
background, is persuaded by his perusal of relevant, peer-reviewed 
literature that the case for anthropogenic climate change is overwhelming. 
He confides as much in an email to his sister. Nonetheless, for ideological 
reasons, Alan believes that proposed climate legislation is wrong in 
principle and bad for the American economy. So, in addition to making 
economic arguments against such legislation, Alan persistently contends 
that the evidence for anthropogenic climate change is more uncertain than 
he knows it to be. If a prosecutor in a state with particularly broad anti-
fraud laws were to prosecute Alan for misleading the public through his 
                                                                                                                 
 299. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial 
Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (1996).  
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deceitful commentary, the First Amendment would no doubt bar such a 
prosecution. Indeed, because the right of an individual in the United States 
to participate in public discourse is so rigorously protected, few prosecutors 
in this country would even consider prosecuting a blogger for even 
intentional misstatements of facts designed to mislead the public with 
regard to the desirability of legislation. 
b) Audience Interests 
(1) The Interest in Receiving Information on Matters of Public Concern 
Another important democratic interest served by free and open public 
discourse is the audience interest in receiving information needed to 
develop informed views on matters of public policy.
300
 And while only 
flesh-and-blood individuals have democratic interests in participating in 
public discourse, “[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals, 
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information 
and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”
301
 It could be 
powerfully argued, however, that lies not only fail to promote but actually 
undermine “the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information” 
needed by citizens to knowledgeably participate in public discourse and to 
competently perform their electoral duties. 
 A powerful argument for extending First Amendment protection to lies 
in order to promote the audience’s interest in access to information and 
perspectives is the concern, discussed above, that government officials 
cannot be trusted to fairly and accurately identify and prosecute knowingly 
false statements in the often highly ideological context of public discourse. 
It is possible that “the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors”
302
 
would impede information and distort perspectives made available to the 
audience to such an extent that the cure would be worse than the disease. 
Still, even when the likely distorting effects of selective prosecutions are 
accounted for, it may be that the accuracy—and, hence, the reliability and 
usefulness—of the information available to citizens would be enhanced if 
lies in public discourse were not protected by the First Amendment. 
Whether granting government the power to punish lies in public 
discourse will impede or promote the audience interest in receiving useful 
information and perspectives is a difficult empirical question. So, if 
                                                                                                                 
 300. See Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 286, at 500–01. 
 301. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). 
 302. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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providing information and perspectives to the electorate were the only 
consideration, a good case might be made that the First Amendment should 
not protect intentional factual misrepresentations in public discourse. 
Standing in the way of this conclusion, however, is a deep, though 
underexplored, principle of American popular sovereignty. 
(2) The Interest in Being Treated as Rational Agents Capable of 
Exercising Authority as Ultimate Sovereign  
As James Madison wrote in denouncing the Sedition Act of 1798, “The 
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.”
303
 For this 
reason, as Madison had earlier observed in discussing the nature of popular 
sovereignty, “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and 
not in the Government over the people.”
304
 To vindicate this basic 
democratic precept, the First Amendment forbids the government from 
punishing speech even if the government believes the expression will lead 
the electorate to make unwise or even disastrous social policy decisions.
305
 
Imagine that certain persuasive voices in public discourse were 
influencing public opinion against ratification of a treaty essential to our 
national security. Even if it could be shown to a moral certainty that 
rejection of this treaty would have catastrophic consequences for the nation, 
including greatly increasing the risk of nuclear attack on our soil, it would 
be unthinkable within our democratic traditions for the government to 
prohibit public opposition to the treaty.
306
 And I would suggest that it is no 
                                                                                                                 
 303. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)). 
 304. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794). 
 305. The First Amendment “embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the 
means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad . . . . The State’s fear 
that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling 
justification for limiting speech.” Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“But it cannot be the duty, 
because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public against false doctrine.”). 
 306. See, e.g., THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15–16 (1996) (“[C]itizens have a right to rule because the right 
embodies the liberty or the equality of citizens. Even if citizens make bad decisions on 
certain occasions, it remains that the mistakes are rightfully theirs to make.”); see also 
Thomas Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Spring 2015), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=democracy 
[https://perma.cc/JX8A-6L2H] (“[T]he right of self-government gives one a right, within 
limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself 
or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for 
themselves regarding those activities they share.”). 
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more permissible for government to suppress this expression because it 
contains factual misrepresentations calculated to mislead the public into 
opposing the ratification of the treaty. This is because the First Amendment 
presumes that, in our capacity as the ultimate governors of society, we are 
rational agents capable of sorting out truth from falsity without government 
supervision.
307
 As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently explained more than 
seventy years ago, “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to 
foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public 
mind . . . In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth.”
308
 
This is not to say, of course, that humans in general, or the American 
populace in particular, are, in fact, fully rational beings. We obviously are 
not. But the attribution of rationality to participants engaging in public 
discourse is not a description; it is, rather, an ascription. As Justice Jackson 
suggests, this ascription derives from the basic democratic precept that “We 
the People,” who possess the ultimate sovereign power, are capable of self-
government without the need of government guardianship to keep us from 
being misled in our capacity as ultimate sovereign.
309
 Through this lens, 
allowing government to determine which claims in public discourse are true 
and which are false would present not just the pragmatic difficulties I have 
emphasized; such government guardianship would in principle violate the 
core democratic precept that the people are capable of ruling themselves. 
To see why governmental suppression of lies in public discourse to 
prevent the people from being misled is contrary to a basic precept of 
popular sovereignty—at least as traditionally understood in this country—
imagine that you are a ruler who originally possessed all of the political 
power in a certain society. In order to form a “more perfect” society, 
“establish Justice,” etc., you “ordain and establish” a constitution, which, 
among other things, delegates legislative power to a national assembly. 
Despite this delegation, however, you retain the ultimate sovereignty in this 
society, including the power to select the members of the assembly, to 
directly make provincial laws, and to adopt a new constitution.  
Suppose that the assembly passes a law empowering your ministers to 
keep from you any publication that in their judgment contains knowing 
                                                                                                                 
 307. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355 (2010) (stating that our form of 
government “entrust[s] the people to judge what is true and what is false”). 
 308. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 309. See id. at 545–46 (“This liberty was not protected because the forefathers 
expected . . . that its exercise always would be wise, temperate, or useful . . . . [T]his liberty 
was protected because they knew of no other way by which free men could conduct 
representative democracy.”). 
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falsehoods that might deceive you into making the wrong decision in the 
exercise of your retained power. Let us further suppose that, although there 
is a possibility that such censorship will deprive you of valuable 
information or perspectives you need to make these decisions, on balance it 
is more likely that this guardianship arrangement will improve the quality 
of the information you receive. Even with the possibility of receiving more 
accurate information, wouldn’t you prefer that, instead of being prevented 
from having access to any mendacious material, your ministers let you see 
it while pointing out to you the statements that they thought were untrue? It 
seems to me that this advisory arrangement would better respect your 
authority as ultimate sovereign than would the guardianship arrangement. 
What this thought experiment shows, I believe, is that government might 
properly add its own voice to the discussion and advise citizens that a 
statement made in public discourse is a lie. But it also suggests that 
punishing speakers for making knowing factual misrepresentations in order 
to prevent these lies from deceiving the people about the desirability of 
legislation or any other matter of public concern is inconsistent with the 
people’s role as the ultimate governors of society.  
The Supreme Court would undoubtedly agree that bans on knowing 
misstatements in public discourse run afoul of the First Amendment. As 
Justice Kennedy explained in United States v. Alvarez, “Our constitutional 
tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of 
Truth.”
310
 Rather, “The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is 
true.”
311





                                                                                                                 
 310. 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). 
 311. Id. at 727 
 312. See id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Laws restricting false statements about 
philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like . . . in many 
contexts . . . call[] for strict scrutiny.”); id. at 751–52 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“laws prohibiting false statements about history, science, and similar matters” would present 
a “grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech”). The one exception is the 
imposition of civil liability, subject to various First Amendment safeguards, for defamation 
of public officials or of private figures on matters of public concern, see Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 
(1964). But the rationale for defamation laws is to protect individual reputations, not to 
prevent the people from being misled about some matter within their authority as ultimate 
governors of society. As discussed below, the precept that it is wrong in principle for the 
government to prohibit lies in public discourse to prevent the audience from being misled 
carries over to the election domain. See infra note 344 and accompanying text. 
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2. Government-Managed Domains 
While government regulation of the content of speech in the domain of 
public discourse must be strictly limited for this domain to accomplish its 
core democratic purpose, in other settings, pervasive government 
management of various activities—including speech—is essential if 
government is to accomplish its various functions.
313
 Thus, in settings 
devoted to some purpose other than public discourse—such as effectuating 
government policy in the workplace, the administration of justice in the 
courtroom, or education in public schools—government has far greater 
leeway to regulate the content of speech.
314
 For instance, although an anti-
war protestor has a right to wear a jacket on a public street bearing the 
message “Fuck the Draft,”
315
 profanity may be constitutionally banned in 
the government workplace, in the courtroom, and in the public 
classroom.
316
 Similarly, while a blogger may have a First Amendment right 
to make knowingly false claims about the causes and effects of climate 
change, a government employee can, consistent with the First Amendment, 
be fired for making a knowingly false statement on this subject in a 
government report.
317
 Likewise, a student can be disciplined for lying to his 
                                                                                                                 
 313. In conceptualizing the terrain of speech regulation as being divided into various 
domains, I have been heavily influenced by the seminal work of Robert Post. See, e.g., 
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY AND MANAGEMENT 
(1995). 
 314. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that the discharge of 
assistant district attorney for criticism of her superior did not violate the First Amendment); 
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925–26, 928 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting First Amendment 
challenge by an attorney defending anti-abortion protestors who was held in contempt for 
violating a court order prohibiting the attorney from using words such as “baby killer” linked 
to excluded defenses because “[d]uring a trial, lawyers must speak . . . with relevance and 
moderation”). 
 315. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971). 
 316. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (rejecting First 
Amendment challenge by a student suspended for using “offensively lewd and indecent 
speech” at a high school assembly); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 820–21 (6th Cir. 
2001) (concluding that a university instructor’s suspension for using profane language in 
class did not violate the First Amendment); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 
1985) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by a university instructor discharged for 
persistent use of profanity in the classroom); Jackson v. Bailey, 605 A.2d 1350, 1359 (Conn. 
1992) (upholding a contempt conviction against the party for using profanity in the 
courtroom); Dargi v. Terminix Int’l Co., 23 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(upholding a contempt conviction against the party for use of profanity during a deposition).  
 317. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 
1001 (2012), which criminally punishes a person who “in any matter within the jurisdiction 
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teacher about why he did not turn in on time his report on climate change, 
and an expert witness in a court case can be convicted for making 
knowingly false statements about climate change.
318
 There can be 
reasonable disagreement about whether the right to engage in invective and 
lies in public discourse promotes or hinders democratic self-governance; 
but there can be no doubt that such expression is inimical to the proper 
functioning of government-managed domains such as the workplace, the 
classroom, and the courtroom.  
3. Elections as a Government-Managed Domain 
In a previous article, I suggested that “the election domain” is “a sphere 
which the Constitution permits, and on occasion, even requires the 
government to manage.”
319
 This claim should be uncontroversial, for there 
can be no sensible objection to the government setting the time for an 
election, designating polling places, designing the ballot, providing voting 
apparatus, counting the ballots, and announcing the results. Indeed, 
government has an affirmative constitutional duty to provide for elections
320
 
and to conduct them in a fair and equitable manner.
321
 So the question is not 
whether a government-managed domain of elections exists
322
 but rather 
                                                                                                                 
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, 
knowingly and willfully—(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or 
device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to 
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry”).  
 318. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720 (acknowledging the “unquestioned constitutionality of 
perjury statutes”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 319. James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An 
Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1083 (2002). For a comprehensive discussion of 
elections, including election speech, as a domain distinct from the domain of public 
discourse, see Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284. See also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign 
Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (conceiving election 
speech as “institutionally bound” as part of the governmentally structured institution of 
elections); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999) (distinguishing between the realm of politics and political speech, 
on the one hand, and elections and election-related speech, on the other).  
 320. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964); see also Ex parte Yarbrough, 
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884); John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private 
Use of Deadly Force, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1269 (2014) (“[E]lections must also be 
considered a non-delegable governmental function.” (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 
469 (1953) (plurality opinion)). 
 321. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000). 
 322. See Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The 
Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 863–64 (“There can be no elections 
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what activities are properly assigned to that domain. In Part III of this 
Article, I will discuss the crucial and difficult question of which type of 
campaign lies may be properly regulated as part of the election domain and 
which are properly deemed part of public discourse. But first, I will note the 
many other forms of campaign speech that government may 
constitutionally regulate as part of its authority to manage the election 
domain.  
The propriety of some speech regulation in this domain is undisputed—
for instance, laws mandating that candidates’ names appear with equal 
prominence on the ballot.
323
 More controversially, the Supreme Court has 
upheld as consistent with the First Amendment the power of government to 
exclude the names of marginal parties and candidates from the ballot;
324
 to 
prohibit write-in voting, even when such voting is engaged in as a means of 
political protest;
325
 and to forbid electioneering speech near the polls.
326
 
Tellingly, in upholding these restrictions the Court has expressly affirmed 
rationales for speech regulation that would be patently improper for 
regulating public discourse.  
In Burdick v. Takushi, for instance, in upholding a prohibition on write-
in voting, the Court observed that “the function of the election process is to 
winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates”
327
 and that 
“[a]ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive function would 
undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.”
328
 
There can be no doubt, however, that the Court would roundly condemn as 
unconstitutional any attempt by government to regulate the content of 
public discourse to make it operate “fairly and efficiently.”  
Similarly, in Jenness v. Fortson, in permitting the exclusion of marginal 
candidates from the ballot, the Court explained: “There is surely an 
important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a 
significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political 
organization’s candidate on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in avoiding 
                                                                                                                 
without rules to guide them, and, for more than a century at the federal level, rules have been 
enacted, and sustained by courts, which go beyond simple facilitation of election mechanics 
to regulate in detail how candidates and their supporters might permissibly behave.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 323. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-466 (2004) (detailing uniformity required in 
candidates’ appearance on the ballot). 
 324. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).  
 325. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992).  
 326. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
 327. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)). 
 328. Id. 
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confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic 
process . . . .”
329
 As with regulation to promote fairness and efficiency, it 
would be blatantly unconstitutional for government in the United States to 
regulate the content of public discourse to avoid “confusion [or] deception” 
or “even frustration of the democratic process.”  
In Burson v. Freeman, which upheld a ban on solicitation of votes and 
the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the 
entrance to a polling place, the Court relied on the state’s interest in 
preventing “intimidation and fraud.”
330
 While the state has some closely 
circumscribed power to prevent these harms by regulating the content of 
public discourse,
331
 it plainly has no such power to achieve these ends by 
such broad, prophylactic measures.
332
 Professors Frederick Schauer and 
Richard Pildes are therefore surely correct in characterizing elections as 
“highly structured spheres” that include speech regulations “that would be 
impermissible in the general domain of public discourse.”
333
  
Significantly, the power of government to regulate speech within the 
election domain extends beyond the polling place and the ballot. As I have 
previously suggested, campaign finance laws often regulate activities at the 
cusp of the public discourse and election domains.
334
 From this perspective, 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area can be seen as attempting to give 
each domain its due by assigning some election financing activities to the 
domain of public discourse, while placing other activities in the election 
domain.
335
 Such an allocation is most apparent in the Court’s 
contribution/expenditure dichotomy. Noting that large contributions have 
the potential to corrupt or appear to corrupt elected officials, and finding 
that contribution limitations only marginally affect speech, the Court in 
effect assigned contributions to the election domain, thereby allowing 
government considerable authority to regulate this activity.
336
 In contrast, 
the Court has found independent expenditures for election speech to be an 
                                                                                                                 
 329. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442. 
 330. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211. 
 331. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. 
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).  
 332. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).  
 333. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1816; accord McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378–79 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “protection of 
the election process justifies limitations upon speech that cannot be imposed generally”).  
 334. Weinstein, Speech Categorization, supra note 285, at 1082–84. 
 335. Id. at 1084–85. 
 336. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21, 59 (1976).  
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essential part of the public debate and, thus, assigned this activity to the 
realm of public discourse where it has received rigorous protection.
337
  
Disclosure requirements provide another example of the government’s 
ability to regulate electoral speech in a way that would be impermissible 
with respect to public discourse. Despite well-established precedent 
recognizing the right of speakers engaged in public discourse to speak 
anonymously,
338
 the Court has upheld laws requiring political 
advertisements on behalf of candidates to disclose the names of the 
sponsors of the advertisements.
339
 Cases involving public employee speech 
provide another example. While the First Amendment generally protects the 
right of public employees to participate in public discourse,
340
 the Court has 
                                                                                                                 
 337. Id. at 19–20, 39, 45–54. The Court in Buckley did not expressly acknowledge this 
dichotomy as reflecting domain allocation and may not even have perceived of elections as 
being a distinct domain from public discourse. See Baker, supra note 319, at 29 (“Buckley 
did not even take up the possibility of viewing electoral speech as part of an institutionally-
bound governing process.”); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1825 (explaining that the 
Court in Buckley did not confront the question of whether “elections can be demarcated, for 
First Amendment purposes, from the general domain of public discourse.”). Indeed, 
adopting something akin to the All-Inclusive approach, it purported to apply “strict scrutiny” 
to contribution limitations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. As the Court subsequently 
acknowledged, however, this is not the level of scrutiny actually employed in such cases: 
“[W]hen reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, there is no place for a 
strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the 
words ‘strict scrutiny.’ . . . The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to 
contribution limits (Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’ 
ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular 
expertise.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (internal quotations omitted), 
overruled on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Although recent 
cases have applied somewhat greater First Amendment scrutiny to contributions to political 
candidates, see, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014); Randall v. 
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006), it is still far less rigorous than the protection provided 
independent expenditures.  
 338. E.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 339. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–76. As 
discussed above, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the Court 
invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous literature concerning a ballot 
initiative. As discussed below, restrictions on lies about ballot initiatives, as opposed to lies 
by and about candidates for elected offices, should be allocated to the domain of public 
discourse rather than to the election domain. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.2. 
 340. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Pickering v. 
Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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upheld restrictions on public employees’ ability to participate in electoral 
politics, including speaking in favor of a candidate for office.
341
 
The cases just discussed suggest that government generally has more 
authority to regulate speech, including false statements of fact, in the 
election domain than it does in the domain of public discourse. But this is 
not always the case. Indeed, speech in the election domain is, arguably, 
sometimes entitled to greater protection than it would be in public 
discourse.
342
 So Schauer and Pildes are correct in observing that “we could 
decide that elections constitute[] a distinct domain for First Amendment 
purposes without committing to what we would do within that domain.”
343
  
Relatedly, although public discourse and elections are usefully 
conceptualized as distinct domains, they share a similar purpose in that they 
are the two indispensable features of democratic self-governance. Whatever 
else it may be, a political system lacking either free and fair elections or the 
right of citizens to participate in public discourse is no democracy. For this 
reason, both when participating in public discourse and when engaging in 
our electoral functions, we are acting in our capacity as ultimate sovereign. 
Accordingly, the basic precept of American popular sovereignty discussed 
in Section II.B.1, above, applies to the election domain as well as the 
domain of public discourse. This means that, as lower courts have held,
344
 it 
                                                                                                                 
 341. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); 
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).  
 342. There is some suggestion in the case law that defamatory statements about 
candidates for elected office should be entitled to absolute immunity, not just the New York 
Times v. Sullivan malice standard generally applicable to defamatory statements about the 
official duties of those who hold that office. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 
265, 271–72 (1971) (stating that because the First Amendment “has its fullest and most 
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,” publications 
concerning candidates “must be accorded at least as much protection under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office” (emphasis added)); 
see also Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 833 (Wash. 2007) 
(Alexander, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the plurality opinion could be interpreted as 
holding that the First Amendment provides absolute immunity against defamation suits by 
candidates for elected office). Accord, Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1808 n.24. 
(suggesting that the Court in Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), might have provided 
absolute immunity to false campaign promises rather than the qualified immunity of New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). See also Arkansas Educational Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 669 (1998) (indicating that a public broadcaster’s exclusion of 
a candidate from a candidate debate is subject to greater First Amendment scrutiny than 
other exercises of editorial judgment by a public station.). 
 343. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1808.  
 344. See 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 (8th Cir. 2014) (“observing 
that [t]he citizenry, not the government, should be the monitor of falseness in the political 
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is wrong in principle for government to ban lies in political campaigns in 
order to prevent the electorate from being misled about a matter within its 
collective decision making authority. As we will see, however, this crucial 
limitation nevertheless leaves room for banning lies for other reasons.  
But while elections and public discourse are the two essential 
components of democracy, and while there is considerable overlap in the 
democratic functions they serve (particularly in promoting political 
legitimacy), there are also significant differences in the purposes of these 
democratic domains. Most significantly, an important function of public 
discourse is to provide citizens with information and perspectives needed to 
“vote wise decisions,”
345
 while the key purpose of elections is to enable 
citizens to select their governors or, through ballot initiates, to enact laws 
directly. 
 Another significant difference inheres in the reasons that government 
regulates these two essential democratic domains. When government seeks 
to regulate public discourse, it usually does so for reasons not directly 
related to promoting democratic self-governance, such as preserving public 
order, protecting individual dignitary interests, or defending national 
security. In contrast, regulations on speech in the election domain, be it a 
ban on writing in candidates or a prohibition on election lies, are usually 
justified as promoting the fairness or efficiency of an essential democratic 
process. As such, unlike regulation of speech in public discourse, regulation 
of speech in the election domain usually involves democracy on both sides 
of the ledger. For this reason, it is true both that the First Amendment “has 
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns 
                                                                                                                 
arena”); Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 827–28 (Wash. 2007) (criticizing the claim 
that “the State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political 
debate” as “fundamentally at odds with the principles embodied in the First Amendment”); 
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 698–99 
(Wash. 1998) (referring to the “claimed compelling interest to shield the public from 
falsehoods during a political campaign” as “patronizing and paternalistic” because it 
“assumes the people of this state are too ignorant or disinterested to investigate, learn and 
determine for themselves the truth or falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of 
the government itself to fill the void”). See also Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 
1256 (Mass. 2015) (quoting statement from 281 Care Comm. quoted above). 
 345. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960).  
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 and that “no justification for regulation is more 
compelling than protection of the electoral process.”
347
  
III. Allocating Laws Regulating Election Lies to Their Proper Domain  
As illustrated by the cases discussed in Part I, the typical approach to 
deciding whether a prohibition on false statements in the election context 
violates the First Amendment is to assess to what level of scrutiny the law 
should be subjected. Under the All-Inclusive Approach, laws punishing 
even knowing falsehoods not fitting within “the few historic and traditional 
categories of expression long familiar to the bar”
348
 are subject to strict 
scrutiny and, thus, “near-automatic condemnation.”
349
 Not only does this 
approach have the potential to invalidate laws that should be deemed 
constitutional, it also clouds analysis of the interests at stake. With respect 
to laws that judges wish to uphold, this approach would likely obscure 
analysis as well as distort doctrine by requiring them to procrusteanly force 
the law into one of these “traditional” exceptions. Alternatively, judges 
wanting to uphold bans on campaign lies could apply a watered-down 
version of strict scrutiny, thereby weakening a test that performs an import 
function in protecting public discourse.
350
  
The use of intermediate scrutiny for measuring the validity of laws 
regulating false campaign statements, which dicta in Justice Breyer’s 
plurality opinion in Alvarez appears to endorse,
351
 provides a better vehicle 
than does the All-Inclusive Approach for analyzing the relevant interests 
and for reaching correct results. It is nonetheless sub-optimal, for it does not 
directly consider how the law in question might affect the domains of 
public discourse and elections.  
The framework I propose, in contrast, seeks first to properly allocate the 
law in question either to the domain of public discourse or to the election 
                                                                                                                 
 346. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 272. 
 347. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 348. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (internal quotations 
omitted)).  
 349. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 350. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring); 
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 286, at 512; see also Baker, supra note 
319, at 6.  
 351. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730–31, 736 (Breyer, J., concurring). See supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. See also supra note 237. 
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domain; it then focuses on the proper level of scrutiny to be applied. To 
determine the domain to which the law should be assigned, this framework 
inquires: (1) the extent to which the law in question advances the core 
purposes of the election domain to promote fair and efficient elections; as 
compared to (2) the extent to which the law in question impairs the core 
democratic purposes of the domain of public discourse to promote political 




As mentioned above, it is very likely that the United States Supreme 
Court would invalidate on First Amendment grounds a broad-based 
prohibition of campaign lies, such as the Minnesota and Ohio laws struck 
down by the Eighth and Sixth Circuits in 281 Care Committee and SBA 
List, respectively.
353
 The domain-allocation framework I propose is 
consistent with the results in these cases. As we shall see, under the 
domain-allocation framework, much of the speech regulated by such broad 
bans on campaign lies would be deemed public discourse, rendering these 
law substantially overbroad and, hence, facially unconstitutional. In 
contrast, narrower laws directly promoting the fairness and efficiency of 
elections might well pass constitutional muster. An example of such 
narrowly-focused laws are those prohibiting false statements about election 
procedures, such as the day the election will be held, the proper place to 
cast one’s vote, or voting requirements.  
A. Laws Prohibiting False Statements About the Time, Place, or Manner of 
Voting  
In a lucid and insightful article on regulation of campaign lies, Professor 
Richard Hasen discusses the constitutionality of punishing knowingly false 
statements about the day an election is going to be held.
354
 He gives an 
example of the false statement that “Republicans vote on Tuesday, 
Democrats vote on Wednesday.”
355
 I agree with Hasen that it should be 
constitutional for a state to criminalize such speech if made both with 
                                                                                                                 
 352. Accord Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77 
TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1842–43 (1999) (“How we decide which speech gets incorporated into 
the [election domain], and which speech remains within public discourse, must . . . depend 
on a full assessment of the impact on public discourse and on elections.”). 
 353. See supra Sections I.A.4, I.B.5, I.B.7.  
 354. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74 
MONT. L. REV 53 (2013). 
 355. Id. at 71. 
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knowledge that the statement was false and with the intent to deceive.
356
 I 
also agree that government has a compelling interest in protecting the right 
to vote, that these laws present little risk of selective prosecution, and that 
the falsity of this speech is easily verifiable.
357
 I suggest, however, that the 
framework I propose offers more telling reasons that such a law does not 
violate the First Amendment.  
Looking first to the election domain, laws banning knowing falsehoods 
calculated to deceive someone about when to vote directly promote the 
fairness of the election. Indeed, if government were powerless to stop such 
deception, the integrity of the election process might be badly 
compromised. As to the effect of the law on the domain of public discourse, 
by no latitude of interpretation can such knowingly false statements about 
election procedures, as opposed to false statements about the substance of 
an election, be characterized as an attempt by the speaker to persuade others 
about “the organization and culture of society” or otherwise as contributing 
to the formation of public opinion. For this reason, the proscription does not 
violate the precept of American popular sovereignty, discussed in Section 
II.B.1, that it is wrong in principle for government to prohibit false 
statements in order to prevent the people from being misled about some 
collective decision within the authority as ultimate sovereign.  
 Relatedly, banning such expression will not diminish the legitimacy of 
the legal system with respect to someone prevented from engaging in such 
intentional misstatements. Similarly, banning false statements about when 
an election will be held obviously will not deprive the electorate of valuable 
information or perspectives; nor will such a narrowly-targeted ban “chill” 
the expression of any useful information.  
To be sure, the miniscule risk of selective enforcement and the easily 
verifiable falsity of these statements—factors Hasen emphasizes—are 
relevant to this analysis. Similarly, that the state may have a “compelling,” 
rather than just an important, reason to ban such lies is surely a relevant 
consideration. However, the significance of these considerations is better 
understood, I believe, within this overall framework.  
For the reasons just stated, bans on knowingly false statements about 
election procedures should be allocated to the election domain. Such an 
allocation does not mean, however, that a law automatically comports with 
the First Amendment (or, for that matter, with any other constitutional 
limitation). In light of exceedingly strong reasons for outlawing lies about 
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the date of an election and the corresponding lack of impairment to any free 
speech or other constitutional values resulting from the ban, there is no 
conceivable claim that this law is not a proper exercise of governmental 
management of the election domain.  
In contrast, other laws properly allocated to the election domain may 
raise more substantial constitutional concerns. For example, as Hasen 
correctly concludes, laws prohibiting misleading, as opposed to literally 
false, statements about an election procedure can present difficult 
questions.
358
 He gives as an example the statement “bring identification 
with you to the polls” in a state that does not have a voter identification 




A law prohibiting intentionally misleading, as well as literally false, 
statements about election procedures would, like a law proscribing only 
false statements, vindicate an important, perhaps even compelling, purpose 
of the election domain. Concededly, the greater scope and uncertainty of 
such a law might have a more significant impact on the legitimizing and 
information functions of the domain of public discourse. Still, since it 
proscribes only intentionally deceptive statements about election 
procedures, not opinions about the subject of the election, the detriment to 
this domain would be minimal. Thus, like a ban on literally false 
statements, this law should be allocated to the election domain. But if, as 
Hasen contends, such a law “would open up prosecutorial discretion and the 
potential for political gamesmanship,”
360
 then the law should be deemed 
unconstitutional. It should be invalidated, however, not because it fails to 
pass the strict scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions on speech in 
the domain of public discourse. Rather, if Hasen is right in his assessment, 
it should be unconstitutional because the law on balance fails to promote, 
and may even undermine, the key purpose of the election domain to 
promote fair elections.  
Having considered regulations on a type of speech falling squarely 
within the election domain, I now want to move to the other end of the 
spectrum and discuss regulations that, in my view, should unquestionably 
be allocated to the domain of public discourse.  
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B. Laws Punishing Lies About Ballot Measures 
Suppose that Beth, a reproductive rights activist opposing a state ballot 
initiative restricting certain abortion procedures, makes statements that she 
knows to be false about the medical necessity of late-term abortions. This 
lie seems for First Amendment purposes basically indistinguishable from 
Alan’s lie, discussed above, about the causes and effects of climate 
change.
361
 Even if prohibiting lies in public discourse would improve the 
reliability of the information and perspectives provided to the electorate, 
such restrictions would, as I argued above, also have a significant, 
detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, as well 
as on the morality of enforcing particular laws against dissenters. The only 
relevant difference between Alan’s lies and Beth’s lies is that the 
cumulative effect of lies about a ballot initiative are arguably more likely to 
result in misguided laws than lies in public discourse that influence public 
opinion generally. And lies made by official sponsors of a ballot measure or 
by committees, such as those alleged in 119 Vote No! Committee, might 
have a particularly pernicious effect as compared to bloggers like Beth 
lying about a ballot measure.  
 To begin with, the interest in preventing voters from being deceived into 
enacting misguided laws does not directly relate the core function of the 
election domain of assuring fair and efficient elections. But more 
fundamentally, this justification runs headlong into the basic principle of 
popular sovereignty that, as discussed in Section II.B.1, it is wrong in 
principle for government to prohibit speech in order to prevent the people 
from being misled about a matter within their capacity as ultimate 
sovereign. For this reason, laws prohibiting lies about ballot initiatives 
should be allocated to the domain of public discourse, where they will be 
subject to strict scrutiny and invalidated.
362
  
C. Laws Regulating Lies by and about Candidates 
As just discussed, with respect to laws banning lies about ballot 
measures, it makes no difference if the law punishes an independent 
speaker or the official sponsors of the measure. In contrast, with regard to 
laws prohibiting lies in candidate elections, the distinction between speech 
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made independent of a candidate’s campaign and speech made by a 
candidate or those associated with a candidate’s campaign becomes crucial. 
1. Laws Prohibiting Anyone from Making Knowingly or Recklessly False 
Statements about a Candidate for Public Office 
Suppose that Beth, the pro-choice blogger, falsely accuses a pro-life 
candidate for the United States Senate of having recently paid for his 
daughter to have an abortion. Suppose further that, in making this 
allegation, Beth had no reason to believe that it was true: she just made it 
up. Finally, suppose that Beth is criminally charged under a law prohibiting 
knowingly or recklessly false statements about a candidate for political 
office.  
For basically the same reasons I gave in discussing Beth’s lie about the 
ballot measure, a law punishing Beth for this lie should be allocated to the 
domain of public discourse. This assignment, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the lie is protected. If accusing someone of paying for an abortion 
is defamatory under these circumstances, the First Amendment would not 
protect the statement. But it does mean that lies about candidates should be 
treated precisely the same as speech by citizens about elected officials made 
in public discourse, with all of the constitutional protections afforded such 
expression. Accordingly, a law that prohibited anyone from lying about a 
candidate for public office, as did a provision of the Ohio law at issue in 
SBA List, would be vulnerable to invalidation as substantially overbroad.
363
  
2. Laws Prohibiting Lies by a Candidate About an Opponent 
Now suppose instead that this false accusation is made not by an 
individual acting independently of the campaign, but rather by the opposing 
candidate or that candidate’s organization.
364
 Under the proposed 
framework, this law should be assigned to the election domain. The law 
directly promotes the fairness concern of the election domain by punishing 
lies by candidates or their organizations about other candidates. Indeed, 
such a law can be thought of as a basic ground rule for a fair contest 
analogous to a rule prohibiting boxers from hitting each other below the 
belt. Relatedly, as Professor William Marshall observes about campaign 
falsehoods in general, “false statements can lead or add to voter alienation 
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by fostering cynicism and distrust of the political process.”
365
 Scurrilous 
campaign lies by candidates about their opponents are likely to be a 
particularly potent source of voter alienation. Accordingly, laws seeking to 
curb such expression will also promote this concern of undoubted relevance 
to the election domain.  
At the same time, laws limited to prohibiting lies by candidates, or those 
acting in concert with them, will not impair the core legitimating function 
of the domain of public discourse. Unlike restrictions against lying in public 
discourse imposed on ordinary citizens like Alan or Beth, laws prohibiting 
candidates from lying about their opponents will not significantly diminish 
a candidate’s allegiance to the legal system or undermine the morality of 
applying to candidates for public office laws with which they can 
reasonably disagree. Although a subsidiary purpose of a candidate’s speech 
might sometimes be to contribute to public opinion in the hopes of 
changing laws or policy, this is rarely, if ever, the primary purpose of such 
speech. Rather, the dominant purpose of such expression is to influence 
public opinion in order to get elected.  
A more realistic concern is the adverse consequences that such laws 
might have on candidates’ supplying the electorate with useful information. 
Specifically, it is possible that the beneficial effect of a ban on knowing or 
reckless falsehood by candidates would be outweighed by the “chilling 
effect” such a prohibition might have on truthful speech. Mitigating this 
concern is the requirement, common in contemporary laws regulating 
campaign lies, that the government must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or 
with reckless disregard for the truth. On balance, then, a law prohibiting a 
candidate from making false statements about another candidate should be 
deemed part of the election domain rather than part of the domain of public 
discourse.  
Again, this does not mean that such a law is necessarily constitutional. 
Of particularly serious concern is “the risk of censorious selectivity by 
prosecutors” noted by Justice Breyer. Relatedly, there is reason to be 
skeptical about whether “government is capable of correctly and 
consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political 
speech.”
366
 There is, it is true, little to be concerned about in this regard 
when the statement is easily verifiable, as with, for instance, an accusation 
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that a candidate has been convicted of a felony. It is with more complicated 
questions that this problem will likely arise, such as with claims about “a 
candidate’s voting record on a particular issue.”
367
 Determining whether 
such claims are true or false “may very well require an in-depth analysis of 
legislative history that will often be ill-suited to the compressed time frame 
of an election,” making any such determination “exceedingly difficult.”
368
  
It could therefore be strongly argued that the purpose of the election 
domain in promoting fair elections will actually be undermined rather than 
promoted by bans on election lies even if limited to falsehoods by 
candidates about their opponents. I do not, however, have the expertise in 
election law to make a confident judgment about this difficult empirical 
matter. 
Another objection is that punishment of even knowing falsehoods 
violates the basic precept of American popular sovereignty, discussed in 
Section II.B.1, that the people must be trusted, free from government 
guardianship, to separate truth from falsehood. Significantly, however, as 
also explained above, a ban on candidates making knowingly or recklessly 
false accusations about an opponent can fairly be justified on different 
grounds—namely, maintaining rules for a fair contest and preventing voter 
alienation.
369
 No doubt part of the motivation for the proscription of lies by 
candidates is to keep the voters from being misled.
370
 But it is a familiar and 
salutary feature of First Amendment jurisprudence that the validity of a law 





                                                                                                                 
 367. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1256 (2015). 
 368. Id. An example of a claim about a voting record whose truth or falsity is 
“exceedingly difficult” to ascertain is the accusation in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016), that Congressman Driehaus supported taxpayer-funded 
abortion because he voted for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Sam 
Baker, The Right to Lie in Campaigns Is Safe, for Now, THE ATLANTIC (June 16, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/the-right-to-lie-in-campaigns-is-safe-
for-now/440508/ (“SBA List believes its attack is entirely true, citing the structure of the 
health care law’s insurance subsidies, which calls into question whether an attack like this 
one could ever be ruled definitively true or false.”). 
 369. It is true that these justifications are intrinsically bound up with preventing the 
electorate from being misled. But, as with defamation laws, preventing people from being 
misled is not the ultimate justification. See supra note 312. 
 370. Cf. Marshall, supra note 365, at 294 (“First, and most obviously, false statements 
can distort the electoral process.”). 
 371. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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3. Prohibition of False or Misleading Statements by Candidates About 
Incumbency or Party Affiliation  
There can be little doubt that prohibition of false statements by a 
candidate about matters of incumbency or party affiliation are properly 
allocated to the election domain. Such a prohibition directly promotes the 
domain’s core function of promoting fair and efficient elections. For 
instance, government must have authority to designate incumbency or party 
affiliation on the ballot. Laws prohibiting candidates from falsely claiming 
that they are the incumbent or the nominee of a political party, or from 
making statements likely to mislead voters about these matters, are directly 
related to this authority. In contrast, any effect of such prohibitions on the 
legitimizing or informational function of public discourse would be de 
minimis.  
Considered as part of the government’s authority to regulate speech in 
the domain of elections, a law banning literally false claims by candidates 
about incumbency or party affiliation, made either knowingly or recklessly, 
presents no substantial constitutional concern. A somewhat more difficult 
issue is raised by the prohibition of misleading claims, such as those 
involved in Treasurer of Committee to Elect Lostracco v. Fox,
372
 one of the 
election cases cited in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez. 
There, the campaign material of a judicial candidate referred to the 
candidate as “Judge Fox.”
373
 While this statement was arguably not literally 
false in that Fox, who was running for Circuit Judge, was currently a 
District Judge, this usage was likely to mislead a voter into thinking that 
Fox was the incumbent Circuit Judge and, thus, give him an unfair 
advantage over his opponent.
374
 While Breyer is certainly correct that, in 
the political process, “the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors” is 
generally “high,” it is not at all apparent that this is true with respect to 
misleading claims about incumbency and party affiliation. For this reason, 
such laws should be deemed facially constitutional, with any challenges to 
selective prosecution made on an “as applied” basis.  
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 373. Id. at 447. 
 374. Id. at 447–48. Because the ultimate justification is fair play among candidates, this 
justification would not violate the precept, discussed in Section II.B.1, that it is wrong in 
principle for government to suppress speech to prevent the people from being misled about a 
collective decision within their capacity as ultimate sovereign. See supra note 369 and 
accompanying text. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
230 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:167 
 
 
4. Comprehensive Bans on Lies by Candidates  
Finally, we come to laws that broadly ban candidates from knowingly or 
recklessly making false statements material to an election, including lies 
about themselves. To begin with, the “ground rule for a fair election” 
justification for such a comprehensive ban on lies is more attenuated than 
with a prohibition against candidates lying about other candidates. On the 
other hand, a broader proscription might more effectively advance the 
interest in preventing voter alienation. With respect to its effect on public 
discourse, a broader ban on candidate lies would, in light of the primary 
reason that candidates engaging in campaign speech, likely not have a 
significantly greater negative effect on political legitimacy than would a 
narrower proscription on candidates lying about each other.  
Though such a comprehensive ban on lying by candidates in campaigns 
for public office might arguably improve the usefulness of the information 
and perspectives that candidate speech provides the electorate, it is also 
possible that the “chilling effect” of such a ban could impair the audience’s 
vital interest in receiving information. This is a difficult empirical question 
that needs further investigation. Still, comprehensive as the ban may be, 
since it applies only to candidate speech and its effect on the core 
legitimizing function of public discourse would be minimal, such a ban 
should be allocated to the election domain.  
But even when analyzed as a regulation in such a government-managed 
domain, the constitutionality of such a ban can be seriously doubted. Once 
again, the major problem would be “the risk of censorious selectivity by 
prosecutors,” but now with respect to a vast range of speech, some 
involving statements whose falsity will not be readily verifiable. In 
addition, as discussed above, such a broad law would be more difficult to 
justify as a basic ground rule for fair elections than a narrower ban on 
candidates lying about other candidates. And while preventing voter 
alienation may be a relevant function of the election domain, it is not 
directly related to the domain’s core function to assure fair and efficient 
elections. For these reasons, it could be forcefully argued that such a law 
would be unconstitutional.  
D. The Importance of the Type of Remedy 
The type of remedy imposed by a regulation on campaign lies is relevant 
both to allocating the regulation to its proper domain and determining 
whether the regulation is a constitutional regulation of speech in the domain 
to which it is assigned. Criminal sanctions will tend to have a greater 
“chilling effect” on non-targeted speech than will civil sanctions. With 
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respect to speech about ballot measures or election speech by those not 
associated with the campaign, this distinction will not matter: imposition of 
even civil penalties would still have an undue chilling effect and, thus, 
would be unconstitutional. In contrast, civil penalties rather than criminal 
sanctions might support the constitutionality of even broad bans on lies by 
candidates.  
But a remedy that might assure the constitutionality of a regulation on all 
election lies, arguably even including those about ballot initiatives or about 
candidates by ordinary citizens, is government counterspeech in the form of 
an official determination that a challenged statement is false. A provision 
providing for such a procedure was upheld by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission.
375
 
The Ohio Election Code prohibited anyone during a political campaign 
from using campaign materials to publish any “false statement, either 
knowing the same is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was 
false.” It empowered the Ohio Elections Commission to determine whether 
challenged statement violated this provision and to announce its 
determination to the electorate.
376
 The statement at issue, which the 
Commission found to be false, was made in a newspaper advertisement 
placed by a candidate in a primary election for the office of county 
commissioner alleging that the incumbent commissioner had committed 
illegal acts.
377
 The court, in an opinion by Judge Danny J. Boggs, found that 
investing the Commission with what it referred to as a “truth declaring” 




                                                                                                                 
 375. 926 F.2d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 376. Id. at 575, 579. 
 377. Id. at 575, 576. 
 378. Id. at 579 (quoting Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1206 n.27 
(11th Cir. 1985)). Nine years later, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld against a First 
Amendment challenge the authority of the Election Commission under Ohio’s false 
statement law to issue a reprimand letter to a candidate for distributing, with knowledge of 
its falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was false or not, a brochure accusing his 
opponent of bribery. See McKimm v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 89 Ohio St.3d 139 (2000). As 
discussed above, the Sixth Circuit recently facially invalidated the Ohio false statements law 
in its entirely in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2016). See 
supra notes 253–274 and accompanying text. Shortly thereafter, and relying heavily on the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Susan B. Anthony List, the Ohio Court of Appeals also found the 
law facially unconstitutional. See Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 2016-Ohio-5043, 58 
N.E.3d 1188.  
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Admittedly, such an official truth declaring function might have some 
“chilling effect” on speakers who refrain from making true statements for 
fear that the government will brand them liars. Still, any such chilling of 
expression is miniscule as compared to the chilling effect of even civil 
fines, let alone criminal penalties. A much more formidable objection to 
this type of remedy is that it is not the proper role of government to 
denounce false claims in the political context; rather, the appropriate 
remedy is counterspeech by private citizens or fact checking by news 
organizations. But here I think it is important to distinguish between 
practical objections to the government assuming this function and the 
objection that it is, in principle, wrong for government to play such a role in 
the political arena.  
The practical objection is that government cannot be trusted to determine 
the truth or falsity of statements made in the highly charged and often 
partisan context of politics. Particularly in today’s political environment, 
this objection has considerable merit. For this reason, at least as a policy 
matter—and perhaps even as a constitutional one—even this non-punitive 
remedy should not be applied to lies about ballot measures or about 
candidates by members of the public not associated with a campaign. In 
these contexts, the rough and tumble of public discourse should be allowed 
to sort truth from falsity without the supplement of potentially biased 
government findings. Where such a remedy would be both useful and 
appropriate is as an alternative to coercive measures of questionable 
constitutionality, such as a ban on candidates lying about other 
candidates.
379
 Use of this non-punitive remedy would greatly strengthen the 
case for the constitutionality of such laws.  
The objection on principle, reflected in several lower court opinions,
380
 is 
that it is simply not the job of government to protect people from being 
misled by political speech. This is similar to the basic precept of American 
popular sovereignty that I identify and discuss in Section II.B.1—but 
different in one crucial respect. As I tried to demonstrate in that discussion, 
it is wrong in principle for the government to prevent the ultimate 
sovereign, which in the United States is “We the People,” from being 
exposed to lies in order to prevent the sovereign from being misled about 
some matter within the sovereign’s authority. But as I also have tried to 
show, it is not in principle wrong for the government to advise the 
sovereign that some statement is, in the government’s judgment, a lie. So 
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while such a government “Truth Commission” may, for pragmatic reasons, 
be a bad idea—and because of these practical concerns arguably even 
unconstitutional—such a procedure is not contrary to this basic democratic 
precept.  
Conclusion 
As this Article was to going to press, the United States Supreme Court 
decided an important campaign speech case that casts light on several 
issues discussed in this Article. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,
381
 
the Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds a state law prohibiting 
individuals from wearing political badges, buttons or other political insignia 
inside a polling place on Election Day. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Kagan and Gorsuch, found that a 
polling place was a “nonpublic forum.”
382
 The Court explained that “[t]he 
government may reserve such a forum ‘for its intended purposes, 
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because the 
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’”
383
 Because the law did not 
discriminate on basis of viewpoint, the question for decision was “whether 
Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is ‘reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum: voting.’”
384
 To answer this question, the Court first 
inquired whether Minnesota was “pursuing a permissible objective” in 
banning apparel with political messages inside the polling place.
385
  
The Court easily found that it was. “Casting a vote,” the Court explained, 
“is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a 
representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not 
campaigning.”
386
 For that reason, the Court held that the government “may 
reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that 
                                                                                                                 
 381. 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).  
 382. Id. at 1886. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented. She argued that 
the Court should have certified the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a definitive 
interpretation of the political apparel ban. Id. at 1893 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 383. Id. at 1885 (majority opinion) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators 
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 Thus, the Court concluded that “in light of special purpose 
of the polling place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel 
there because of the message it conveys, so that voters may focus on the 
important decisions immediately at hand.”
388
 
The Court next inquired whether the regulation was reasonable, and 
found that it was not. To pass this reasonableness test, “the State must be 
able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in 
from what must stay out.”
389
 But because of the “unmoored use of the term 
‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations 
the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this 
Court,” the Court held that the restrictions imposed under the law “fail even 
this forgiving test.”
390
 As evidence of the lack of “some sensible basis” for 
distinguishing between prohibited and permitted expression under the 
Minnesota law, the Court cited the answers given by the Minnesota’s 
lawyer at oral argument before the Court:  
A shirt declaring “All Lives Matter,” we are told, could be 
“perceived” as political. How about a shirt bearing the name of 
the National Rifle Association? Definitely out. That said, a shirt 
displaying a rainbow flag could be worn “unless there was an 
issue on the ballot” that “related somehow . . . to gay rights.” A 
shirt simply displaying the text of the Second Amendment? 




Such an “indeterminate prohibition,” the Court admonished, “carries 
with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse . . . .’”
392
 And if voters are subject to, or 
even witness, “unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the State’s 
interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and disruption 
would be undermined by the very measure intended to further it.”
393
 
Significantly, however, in invalidating the Minnesota law, the Court 
emphasized that it was not saying that, in trying to advance the purposes of 
the polling place by banning speech inimical to those purposes, Minnesota 
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“has set upon an impossible task.”
394
 It noted that other States “have laws 
proscribing displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms.”
395
  
Mansky sends signals both about the method of analysis the Court might 
employ in determining the constitutionality of bans on lies in political 
campaigns and about which types of bans it might uphold and which it will 
likely invalidate. A potentially significant feature of Court’s decision is 
that, consistent with the framework I suggest in this Article, the Court 
treated Minnesota’s ban on apparel with political messages in the polling 
place as a regulation not of public discourse but as a speech regulation in a 
government-managed domain. As a result, the Court did not apply strict 
scrutiny to what was manifestly a content-based restriction of expression; 
rather, it inquired—again consistent with the approach I suggest—whether 
this regulation promoted the purposes of the domain in a manner that is 
both viewpoint neutral and reasonable.  
I do not want, however, to exaggerate the significance of the domain 
allocation in this case. Because the law in question regulated speech on 
government property, the Court was able to employ “forum analysis” to 
allocate the ban on political apparel at issue to a government-managed 
domain (that is, a non-public forum). Accordingly, the Court was able to 
avoid any conflict with the “All-Inclusive Approach.”
396
 It remains to be 
seen, therefore, whether the Court will engage in such domain allocation 
when faced with a narrow ban on campaign lies serving some core purpose 
of the election domain but which is not confined to speech on government 
property. There are, however, two indications in Mansky that it might be 




First, there is the Court’s response to the state’s argument that it properly 
banned “Please I.D. Me” buttons because they were designed to confuse 
voters that they needed photo identification to vote. The Court rejected that 
argument because it found that the asserted interest did not align with the 
state’s construction of the law.
398
 In doing so, however, the Court stated: 
“We do not doubt that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead 
voters about voting requirements and procedures.”
399
 Notably, and perhaps 
significantly, the Court does not limit its statement that government may 
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undoubtedly prohibit such intentionally misleading speech to expression 
occurring in a polling place. 
This omission may indicate that if and when faced with a law banning 
messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and 
procedures that it wants to uphold, the Court might extend the government-
managed election domain it recognized in Mansky beyond regulation of 
speech on government property to other settings. For instance, it might 
uphold a ban that applied not just to false or misleading statement in the 
polling place but also extended to flyers put under doors of potential voters 
reading: “Republicans Vote on Tuesday, Democrats on Wednesday
400
 and 
Make Sure to Bring Photo I.D.”
401
 Also suggesting that the Court might in 
such a case expressly allocate speech occurring beyond the confines of 
government property to the election domain is this statement near the end of 
its opinion: “Cases like this ‘present[] us with a particularly difficult 
reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to engage in political 
discourse with the right to vote.”
402
 It is also possible, of course, that the 
Court might, following the plurality opinion it cites for this statement,
403
 
uphold the law as comporting with strict scrutiny. 
This brings us to the second—and somewhat clearer—signal that 
Mansky sends about regulation of campaign lies. Whether it employs the 
domain allocation approach suggested in this Article or subjects the law to 
strict scrutiny, the Court seems inclined to uphold narrow restrictions not 
just on outright lies about voting requirements and procedures but 
intentionally misleading statements on such subjects as well.
404
 By the same 
token, Mansky confirms that whether the Court uses strict scrutiny or the 
often more “forgiving” standard applicable to speech regulation in a 
government-managed domain,
405
 broad bans on campaign lies will be found 
to violate the First Amendment. 
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